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ABSTRACT
A concurrent-embedded mixed method was used to evaluate observed outcomes
of safety culture among multiple collegiate aviation programs in the U.S. A hypothesized
model that measures the relationships between scales of safety management systems
(SMS), safety motivation (mediator), and safety behaviors (safety compliance, safety
reporting, and safety participation) was assessed using structural equation modeling/path
analysis (SEM/PA). Demographic differences in safety culture were also evaluated.
Semi-structured interviews were used further to understand the impacts of SMS on safety
culture. Findings suggest significant predictive relationships between SMS and observed
safety culture outcomes. There was also a significant mediation role of safety motivation
between SMS and some observed safety culture outcomes. An emergent theme from the
interviews suggests that flight instructors play a crucial formative role in sustaining a
positive safety culture in collegiate aviation programs. Implications for policy and
practices in collegiate aviation safety culture and recommendations for future research
are highlighted.

xv

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Safety Management Systems (SMS) are becoming ubiquitous within the aviation
industry. The FAA (2015) recently mandated SMS for part 121 carriers (i.e. airlines).
There are initiatives throughout the aviation industry to continue the expanse of SMS to
include part 135 carriers (NTSB, n.d.) and allow general aviation (GA) organizations
participate in SMS through a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) voluntary program
referred to as Safety Management System Voluntary Program (SMSVP) (FAA, n.d.-a).
A driving force behind SMS implementation is the pursuit of improved safety.
GA accident rates have seen an uptick in recent years. The NTSB (2019) reported
increased GA accident rates between 2017 and 2018 from 331 to 381 accidents,
respectively. This resulted in an increased fatal accident rate in GA of 1.029 fatal
accidents per 100,000 flight hours in 2018, up from the 0.935 fatal accidents per 100,000
hours in 2017 (NTSB, 2019). Scheduled part 121 carriers continue to see stellar safety
performance with 27 accidents and only one fatality in 2018 (NTSB, 2019). The one
fatality resulted from an engine failure that damaged a passenger window, ultimately
resulting in fatal injuries to one passenger (NTSB, 2018). This results in a fatal accident
rate for scheduled 121 carriers of 0.005 fatal accidents per 100,000 hours (NTSB, 2019).
There is room for improvement for GA based on these statistics.
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Stolzer et al. (2016) suggest that the term “safety culture” originated in 1986 with
the Chernobyl nuclear accident. Safety culture has been studied as to its relationship to
safety management and organization accident rates for many years (Booth & Lee, 1995).
Moreover, safety culture has been studied in multiple settings, including energy (GarcíaHerrero et al., 2013), healthcare (Groves et al., 2011), and aviation (Adjekum, 2014,
2017; Liao, 2015). The link between safety culture and SMS implementation has received
more recent attention (Adjekum, 2014, 2017; Robertson, 2016) and requires further
research.
Background
Safety culture in collegiate aviation faces some unique challenges and is often
how aspiring aviators enter into the aviation industry. Ensuring proper education on
safety culture and immersing these aspiring aviators in a positive safety culture will
positively affect their future endeavors. This is based on the notion that time has a strong
influence on safety culture (Robertson, 2016).
Certain desirable cultures can permeate throughout an organization: informed,
flexible, reporting, learning, and just (Stolzer et al., 2016). These cultures contribute to an
overall positive influence on the organization. Conversely, there are undesirable cultural
states. These include secretive and blame cultures (Patankar & Sabin, 2010). These
cultural states are counterproductive to achieving a desirable organizational culture by
suppressing information and not seeking solutions to prevent future incidents.
There is also a distinction to be made between safety culture and safety climate.
While these terms are related, there are some subtle differences in the research literature.
Mearns and Flin (1999) distinguish that safety climate is more of a “snapshot” of
2

prevailing perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs, while safety culture is more of an enduring
trait reflecting values, norms, assumptions, and expectations. One of the distinguishing
factors between climate and culture is time. Climate can be considered to be smaller in
scope in that it is a “snapshot.” Culture is looking at a broader context and the prevailing
culture that endures over a more extended period.
An area of research involving safety culture is that of the relationship between
safety culture and SMS implementation (Gill & Shergill, 2004; McDonald et al., 2000;
Remawi et al., 2011a). Given the initiative to implement SMS, it is critical to evaluate
any potential impacts on the organization—especially safety culture. While
administrations such as the FAA (2015a) and International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) (2009) consider safety culture to be an integral component of SMS, these
relationships need to be researched and validated.
Past research on safety culture in collegiate aviation has investigated the
relationship between SMS implementation and safety culture (Adjekum, 2014, 2017;
Robertson, 2016). Robertson (2016) investigated different approaches to developing and
implementing an SMS, different approaches to assessing safety culture, and the
relationship between elements/processes of an SMS and strong safety culture. This
research was entirely qualitative in its design, and it was suggested to develop
quantitative studies to investigate the findings in parallel to the qualitative components.
Adjekum (2014, 2017) has utilized quantitative designs to research safety culture
in collegiate aviation. The quantitative analysis was conducted via the Collegiate
Aviation Program Safety Culture Assessment Survey (CAPSCAS). This tool was
developed and validated by Adjekum (2014, 2017). However, this analysis has only been
3

performed at one collegiate aviation institution. There is a need to perform this same
analysis at other collegiate aviation institutions to add to the instrument's validity and
improve the generalizability of the findings.
Problem Statement
Research into the mechanisms behind SMS implementation related to safety
culture perceptions in collegiate aviation is beginning, and more research is needed. Since
collegiate aviation is considered a subset of GA and GA has been shown to have higher
rates of accidents than scheduled 14 CFR 121 carriers (NTSB, 2019), continued research
to improve GA's safety is warranted.
Past research into safety culture perceptions in collegiate aviation has been
limited to a single university (Adjekum, 2014, 2017). There is a need to perform similar
research across multiple universities to further validate previous research findings and
provide more generalizability. While SMS is not a requirement for collegiate aviation, it
is possible the make it a requirement at some point in the future. Given that, some
universities have already pursued SMS preemptively (Pinholster, 2019).
Prior research has not addressed different types of SMS [i.e., FAA SMSVP versus
International Business Aviation Council (IBAC) IS-BAO]. An investigation into whether
there is a difference in the type of SMS program pursued by a given institution will have
a differing effect on safety culture perceptions that have not been addressed. An
investigation into any potential differing effects may help collegiate aviation institutions
navigate which direction they would pursue SMS.
The findings from Adjekum (2014, 2016, 2017) found effects of year group and
nationality on safety culture perceptions. Again, that research was performed at a single
4

collegiate aviation institution. Research that has been performed across multiple
universities was strictly quantitative and did not utilize a mixed-method approach
(Adjekum et al., 2015, 2016). The need to test those findings across multiple universities
is warranted for generalizability purposes. This will serve other universities when
developing their SMS and accommodating international students in a collegiate aviation
program.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this proposed research is to explore safety culture perceptions in
collegiate aviation further. Previous research on this topic studied safety culture
perceptions at one university (Adjekum, 2014, 2017). This proposed research will aim to
study safety culture perceptions across multiple universities with varying levels and types
of safety management system (SMS) implementation. It is expected that there may be
differences in safety culture perceptions between universities as well as differences based
on varying levels of SMS and types of SMS programs.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has provided guidance for aviation
practitioners to adopt SMS components on a voluntary basis even though it is not
required by regulation (FAA, n.d.-b). Collegiate aviation programs may pursue this
option if they desire SMS programs and would progress through three different stages:
active applicant, active participant, and active conformance. Additionally, some
collegiate aviation programs have pursued alternative means of SMS compliance through
the International Standard for Business Aircraft Operations (IS-BAO) (NBAA, 2017;
Pinholster, 2019). Both systems adhere to an SMS standard associated with either the
FAA or IBAC.
5

Additionally, this proposed research will continue studying the variation of
national culture has on safety culture perceptions (Adjekum, 2014, 2017). By examining
multiple universities, this will allow for a more robust data set to improve any findings'
validity and reliability. This also provides insight into whether variations of safety culture
perceptions based on national culture are unique to specific organizations or if this
variation in perception is experienced in multiple organizations with diverse students.
Variations based on SMS implementation and nationality will be evaluated based
on their perceptions of safety behavior. Safety behavior has been used as an outcome
variable in multiple studies and is often comprised of two components: safety
participation and safety compliance (Adjekum, 2017; Chen & Chen, 2014; Neal &
Griffin, 2006). In addition to the two traditional components of safety behavior, a safety
reporting behavior scale will be included based on the CAPSCAS (Adjekum et al., 2015,
2016). Perceptions on these three outcome variables will be assessed to determine any
variation based on SMS implementation and nationality.
Previous research and findings have suggested a difference in safety culture
perception based on the year group (Adjekum, 2014). The qualitative component of this
research will aim to address this finding. The goal will be to explore some of the reasons
for such a lag with the ultimate goal of findings ways to expedite or accelerate an
improved safety culture perception. Collegiate aviation faces some unique challenges
concerning safety culture: limited tenure of students and psychological factors leading to
increased risk-taking (Reason, 2008). Further exploration into these factors should
provide results that could help collegiate aviation programs foster a favorable safety
culture perception earlier on in students’ tenure.
6

Research Questions
The quantitative portion of this study will investigate similar questions as past
research (Adjekum, 2017), but at multiple universities. Additionally, by broadening the
sample, new opportunities are present. By studying multiple collegiate aviation programs,
the opportunity to investigate the potential varying effects of SMS implementation level
and type of SMS is presented. Given the continuation of past research utilizing a broader
sample, research questions include:
1. What are the strengths of the relationship between SMS process engagement,
SMS policy implementation, safety motivation, and the outcome variables safety
behavior measured by safety compliance and safety participation and safety
reporting behavior across multiple collegiate aviation programs?
2. What are the differences in perceptions among the demographic variables (year
group, international student status, SMS status, and flight certification) on safety
behavior and safety reporting behavior across multiple universities?
3. Why are there variations in safety culture perceptions based on demographic
criteria?
The qualitative portion of this study will build upon past findings (Adjekum,
2017) to explore some of the mechanisms behind why phenomena such as year group
have on safety culture perception. This qualitative analysis will be performed utilizing a
semi-structured interview based on three primary themes: safety culture and time, SMS
implementation, and safety promotion and communication. The semi-structured interview
outline can be found in Appendix A.
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Figure 1. A hypothetical model showing the relationship between SMS process
engagement, SMS policy implementation, safety motivation and the outcome variables:
safety compliance, safety participation, and safety reporting.
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Statement of Hypotheses
SMS Process Engagement, Safety Motivation, Safety Behavior, and Safety
Reporting
The present study's proposed model is based on the final measurement model
from Adjekum (2017). The original hypothesized model did not include SMS process
engagement nor SMS policy implementation. It was a goal of that research to identify the
factors that measure the latent construct of SMS initiative (Adjekum, 2017). The SMS
initiative scale was based on multiple sources that are directed toward measuring SMS
effectiveness (Chen & Chen, 2012, 2014; Transport Canada, 2005). From the findings of
the foundational research by Adjekum (2017), two factors emerged: SMS process
engagement and SMS policy implementation.
The SMS process engagement scale is directed toward assessing the extent to
which, in collegiate aviation, students and flight instructors are included or engaged with
SMS processes. This is meant to provide a sense of “buy-in” from the frontline
individuals. This sense of involvement or engagement has been shown to be related to
overall favorable perceptions of safety culture based on feedback and engagement
(Adjekum et al., 2016; Chiu et al., 2019). Based on these findings and prior analysis, the
hypothesized direct and indirect effects of SMS process engagement include:
H1: Respondents’ perceptions of their collegiate aviation program's SMS process
engagement are related to their safety motivation.
H2: Respondents’ perceptions of their collegiate aviation program's SMS process
engagement are related to their safety compliance.
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H3: Respondents’ perceptions of their collegiate aviation program's SMS process
engagement are related to their safety participation.
H4: Respondents’ perceptions of their collegiate aviation program's SMS process
engagement are related to their safety reporting.
H5: Respondents’ safety motivation mediates the relationship between their
perceptions of their collegiate SMS process engagement and safety compliance.
H6: Respondents’ safety motivation mediates the relationship between their
perceptions of their collegiate SMS process engagement and safety participation.
H7: Respondents’ safety motivation mediates the relationship between their
perceptions of their collegiate SMS process engagement and safety reporting.
SMS Policy Implementation, Safety Motivation, Safety Behavior, and Safety
Reporting
SMS policy implementation is the second factor identified in the latent
measurement model of the SMS initiative (Adjekum, 2017). SMS policy implementation
deals with the importance of having a clearly articulated SMS policy where roles,
responsibilities, authorities, and communication lines are established. Additionally, it
supports the importance of having backing from top-level personnel, which is regarded as
a fundamental component of SMS (FAA, n.d.-b, 2015a, 2019a; ICAO, 2009; Stolzer et
al., 2016). Moreover, the importance of SMS policy was reflected in the findings by Chen
and Chen (2014). Based on these findings and prior analysis, the hypothesized direct and
indirect effects of SMS policy implementation include:
H8: Respondents’ perceptions of their collegiate aviation program's SMS policy
implementation are related to their safety motivation.
10

H9: Respondents’ perceptions of their collegiate aviation program's SMS policy
implementation are related to their safety compliance.
H10: Respondents’ perceptions of their collegiate aviation program's SMS policy
implementation are related to their safety participation.
H11: Respondents’ perceptions of their collegiate aviation program's SMS policy
implementation are related to their safety reporting.
H12: Respondents’ safety motivation mediates the relationship between their
perceptions of their collegiate SMS policy implementation and safety compliance.
H13: Respondents’ safety motivation mediates the relationship between their
perceptions of their collegiate SMS policy implementation and safety
participation.
H14: Respondents’ safety motivation mediates the relationship between their
perceptions of their collegiate SMS policy implementation and safety reporting.
Proposed Methods
A concurrent embedded mixed-method approach will be utilized to pursue the
research questions. A concurrent embedded design is described as having a primary
method that guides the project and a secondary method embedded within the primary
method (Creswell, 2009). In this case, the quantitative analysis is considered the primary
method, and the qualitative is secondary. In a concurrent triangulation approach, the data
from different methodologies is mixed. Given that the research questions being pursued
by the quantitative and qualitative portions of this study are different, the concurrent
embedded approach better describes the research as there will be a separate analysis of
each respective data. However, some comparisons may take place.
11

Quantitative:
•Survey
•Data Analysis

Concurrent
Embedded
Mixed
Method

Qualitative
•Interviews
•Coding/Theming

Figure 2. Diagram of proposed research methodology.
The qualitative portion of the study will utilize semi-structured interviews of
students, flight instructors, and safety leadership at each collegiate aviation program. The
quantitative portion of the study will utilize a previously validated instrument across a
larger sampling pool to add to its validity to achieve higher generalizability (Adjekum,
2017).
Participation of multiple collegiate aviation programs will be utilized. These
institutions are University Aviation Associations (UAA) members. Given the proposed
research model's parameters, a sample size of at least 280 survey participants is desired
for the quantitative portion.
A qualitative component will be utilized to investigate some of the previous
findings on safety culture perceptions in collegiate aviation. Adjekum (2014, 2017) has
found the year group to affect safety culture perception in collegiate aviation. The
12

quantitative results will tell us if there are meaningful variations in safety culture
perception across multiple universities but will not be able to provide answers to why
these variations exist. A qualitative component of interviewing students, instructors, and
institutional leaders at multiple collegiate aviation programs will explain why any
variation exists. Conducting semi-structured interviews among institutional leaders, flight
instructors, and students of varying year group would be performed. One leader, two
flight instructors, and at least two students at both early and later year groups would be
necessary to attain saturation.
The quantitative portion is primarily aimed at validating prior findings across a
larger sampling pool. Adjekum (2014) found that the year group significantly affected
safety culture perception, but these findings were limited to a single institution. The
current study will determine if these same findings occur across multiple universities with
SMS programs.
Another opportunity presented by researching multiple universities is
investigating any potential effects of having different levels of SMS implementation and
types of SMS. Organizations pursuing SMSVP will need to transition through multiple
implementation levels before having an FAA acceptable SMSVP (FAA, n.d.-a).
Similarly, organizations pursuing SMS through alternative means (i.e., IBAC IS-BAO)
present the opportunity to investigate any potential effects these different programs may
have on safety culture perception. Moreover, IBAC IS-BAO programs must also be
certified through different levels (Pinholster, 2019). Using these differing levels of SMS
implementation as well as the type of SMS program as new demographic variables
presents a new area of research beyond prior findings.
13

Rationale for Methods
Interviews seek to explore subjects' personal experiences related to the study topic
based on their values, attitudes, and beliefs (Saldana & Omasta, 2017). This study's
qualitative portion is meant to delve into individuals’ personal experiences at their
respective institutions. Moreover, safety culture typically deals with values, norms,
assumptions, and expectations (K. J. Mearns & Flin, 1999). A qualitative analysis
utilizing semi-structured interviews is a necessary tool to investigate these attributes.
Adjekum (2017) developed the SMS Policy Implementation and SMS Process
Engagement scales in prior research. The current study will utilize the same tool for
consistency. Additionally, this consistency will provide the opportunity to add to the
reliability and validity of past findings. Given that the present study will address multiple
universities, this will provide the means to ensure past findings were not localized while
expanding on research variables, including implementation level and type of SMS.
Research Assumptions and Limitations
The current study will expand on prior research (Adjekum, 2017) but will not be
comprehensive. This study will collect data from multiple institutions. However, there are
significantly more UAA members than those included in this study (UAA, n.d.). Future
research could broaden the sampling pool to advance knowledge surrounding collegiate
aviation safety culture perceptions.
The cross-sectional approach will investigate safety culture perception at a given
point in time but will not address long-term changes or effects. Longitudinal studies may
help determine if this study's findings indicate a trend based on the research variables. A
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follow-up study at the same institutions after SMS implementation levels have changed
would be beneficial to detect any trends.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter will focus on providing background on safety culture, providing a
framework of the variables on assessing safety culture, fundamental principles of SMS,
and reviewing applicable studies about SMS and safety culture. Safety culture is a broad
term and can manifest in an organization in various ways (Patankar & Sabin, 2010;
Stolzer et al., 2016). Discussion about these different forms of safety culture and relevant
literature that discusses the assessment of safety culture will be provided. SMS can be
implemented in differing ways. A discussion on these differences will be provided.
Finally, a review of recent and noteworthy studies on SMS and safety culture will be
reviewed. This review will include an overview of the previous studies, which have laid
the foundation for the current study. The focus will be on contemporary studies that apply
to the current research and will not be a comprehensive review.
Safety Culture
The concept of safety culture can be traced back to the Chernobyl disaster in 1986
(Stolzer et al., 2016). Since then, there has been a considerable amount of research done
into this topic in the context of multiple industries and disciplines including, but not
limited to, energy (García-Herrero et al., 2013), healthcare (Groves et al., 2011), and
aviation (Adjekum, 2014; Adjekum et al., 2015, 2016; Dillman et al., 2010; Gao &
Rajendran, 2017; Gill & Shergill, 2004; Wang, 2018; Wu et al., 2010). Consequently,
16

several definitions of safety culture have emerged in the literature. A brief exploration of
the terms safety and culture will be discussed. The elements of safety culture that emerge
from the contributing components and dynamics will be provided, and discourse
regarding an overview of some of the specific definitions of safety culture in the
academic literature occurs.
Defining Safety and Culture
Patankar and Sabin (2010) approach the definition of safety culture by breaking
down the term into its individual components (i.e., safety and culture), considering the
contributions of these individual components, and then readdressing the aggregate term
of safety culture. Safety, for instance, is subject to multiple definitions and perspectives
depending upon the environment (i.e., regulatory bodies, insurance companies, engineers,
psychologists, systems theorists). These varying perspectives influence the nature by
which safety is referred to, whether it is acceptable levels of risk, failure modes and
effects, factors resulting in errors or failures, or factors that contribute to a safe or
successful outcome. Although, Patankar and Sabin (2010) state the more contemporary
perspectives that address the dynamic and complex nature of high-reliability
organizations (HROs) may be more appropriate in safety within aviation settings to
include concepts resilience and complex systems theory. Patankar and Sabin (2010) state,
"This approach offers a more dynamic perspective: safety, particularly in HROs, is less a
matter of individual component reliability and more a matter of overall systemic ability
(resilience or adaptability) to cope with threats, errors, and failures. Therefore, resilience
engineers express safety as a measure of systemic adaptability" (p. 98).
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The intricacies of resilience and resilience engineering are beyond the scope of
this research, but these concepts do play a role in defining and understanding safety
culture. Therefore, a brief overview of resilience is prudent. The definition of resilience
faces similar challenges as safety culture in that there are several definitions. Woods
(2015) offers an organized perspective which addresses what resilience is and how to
engineer it in complex adaptive systems through four concepts:
1. resilience as rebound from trauma and return to equilibrium;
2. resilience as a synonym for robustness;
3. resilience as the opposite of brittleness, i.e., as graceful extensibility when
surprise challenges boundaries;
4. resilience as network architectures that can sustain the ability to adapt to
future surprises as conditions evolve.
Another aspect of safety is the nature by which it emerges. Provan et al. (2020)
state, “Safety, or the lack of safety, is an emergent property of an operational system” (p.
1). In this description of safety, the concept of emergence is included. Emergence is the
spontaneous creation of order and functionality from the bottom up (Page, 2009). This
idea of safety being an emergent property suggests that the individual processes or
components are not what creates safety, but it is what emerges from the fully operational
system—safety is not identifiable when considering individual components or processes.
The cultural aspect of the term safety culture is still to be addressed. Patankar and
Sabin (2010) offer anthropological perspectives (e.g., habitat, customs, traditions) as well
as social and organizational scientist perspectives (e.g., quality of life, organizational
effectiveness, safety performance). This cultural aspect is primarily used to describe a
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group of people or the characteristics of an organization. ICAO (2009) refers to culture as
a collective programming of the mind. Moreover, ICAO (2009) suggests that
organizations and their groups of people are subject to influence from various sources:
national culture, professional culture, and organizational culture. These different
influences will impact how the organization and its people’s shared beliefs, practices, and
attitudes.
Once the terms safety and culture have been defined, it is prudent to discuss the
aspects which influence the aggregate term safety culture. Patankar and Sabin (2010)
discuss the components and dynamics that contribute to safety culture. The components
that contribute to safety culture include values, leadership strategies, attitudes, and
performance (Patankar & Sabin, 2010).
The dynamics between these components refer to how they interact to yield a
dominant cultural state, and these interactions can transcend individual, group, and
organizational levels (Patankar & Sabin, 2010). Gill and Shergill (2004) identified
“organizational dynamics and positive safety practices” as a critical factor in their
analysis of employee perceptions of safety management and safety culture. Although,
their findings did suggest this factor was perceived to be the weakest by employees when
compared to the three other factors identified: the regulator’s role, luck and safety, and
safety-management, training, and decision making (Gill & Shergill, 2004).
Dynamics can also be discussed in the context of organizational resilience. Woods
(2015) discusses the role of dynamics in relation to two of the four aspects of resilience:
resilience as graceful extensibility and resilience as sustained adaptability. Graceful
extensibility refers to how a system performs or degrades when operating near system
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boundaries, and sustained adaptability refers to the systems’ ability to produce sustained
adaptability over longer scales (Woods, 2015). Dekker and Woods (2010) use these
concepts of resilience and adaptability to support the notion that safety is not something
organizations have, but it is something they do by continuously assessing and revising
their work to remain sensitive to the possibility of failure.
Defining Safety Culture
There are several available definitions of safety culture in the research literature.
A brief review of some of the more notable and frequently cited definitions will be
provided. This will include definitions and concepts from regulatory bodies such as the
FAA and the research literature.
The FAA addresses safety culture from a variety of perspectives. The FAA
(2015a) states that “safety culture” is essential to an organization's safety performance
and applies to those organizational aspects that relate to safety performance. Safety
culture is not something that can “purchased,” but it is something that is a product of the
values and actions of organizational leadership and learning (FAA, 2015a). All
organizations have a safety culture, whether it is positive or negative. The organization’s
leadership and management's goal is to cultivate positive aspects through open reporting,
just culture, personnel involvement, use of information, commitment to risk reduction,
vigilance, flexibility, and learning (FAA, 2015a).
Wiegmann et al. (2004) performed an integrative review of safety culture
definitions that reviewed various safety culture definitions to assimilate critical features
to derive commonalities. This review included 13 different definitions of safety culture,
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albeit from non-aviation industries between 1991 and 2000. The commonalities found
from their analysis include:
1. Safety culture is a concept defined at the group level or higher that refers to
the shared values among all the group or organization members,
2. Safety culture is concerned with the formal safety issues in an organization
and closely related to, but not restricted to, the management and supervisory
systems,
3. Safety culture emphasizes the contribution form everyone at every level of an
organization,
4. The safety culture of an organization has an impact on its members’ behavior
at work,
5. Safety culture usually reflected in the contingency between reward systems
and safety performance,
6. Safety culture is usually reflected in the organization’s willingness to develop
and learn from errors, incidents, and accidents, and
7. Safety culture is relatively enduring, stable, and resistant to change
(Wiegmann et al., 2004).
A similar review of the literature on safety culture was performed by Guldenmund
(2000). Unlike Wiegmann et al. (2004), Guldenmund (2000) considered research on
safety climate and safety culture. Consequently, the research on safety climate, as
opposed to safety culture, can be traced back to 1951 (Guldenmund, 2000). However,
consideration was given to definitions of safety culture and climate that spanned research
from 1980 to 1997. Guldenmund (2000) wanted to address the lack of models that
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address the relationship between safety culture and climate to safety and risk
management or safety performance. From the analysis, a three-layer framework is
proposed to redefine safety culture: outer layer – artefacts; middle layer – espoused
values/attitudes regarding hardware, software, people/liveware, and risks; and the core –
basic assumptions (Guldenmund, 2000). The artefacts are considered the visible
contributions, the middle layer or espoused values/attitudes are reflected in policies,
training, and manuals, and the core or basic assumptions are implicit and must be inferred
from observation. It is within these layers that the distinction between climate and culture
is made. Guldenmund (2000) posits that the attitudes reflect climate while it is within the
assumptions that culture is represented. The redefined model accounts for differences
between attitudes and assumptions.
Cooper (2000) addressed the development of a model of safety culture with the
goal of being able to use this model to test hypotheses regarding antecedents, behavior(s),
and sequence(s). In developing this model, it was noted that many current definitions of
safety culture focused on shared perceptions, meanings, values, and beliefs while not
accounting for the goal-directed interactions between people, jobs, and the organization.
Therefore, Cooper (2000) suggests organizational culture “…is reflected in the dynamic
reciprocal relationships between members' perceptions about, and attitudes towards, the
operationalization of organizational goals; members' day-to-day goal-directed behavior:
and the presence and quality of the organization's systems and sub-systems to support the
goal-directed behavior,” (p. 117). This definition takes into account more than the way
people think. This definition includes the influences of situational constraints and
people’s behavior.
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Reason (1998) argues, “…a safe culture is an informed culture and this, in turn,
depends upon creating an effective reporting culture that is underpinned by a just culture
in which the line between acceptable and unacceptable behavior is clearly drawn and
understood,” (p. 293). This definition differs from others in that it focuses on components
(i.e., informed, reporting, and just culture) of an overall safety culture. While other
definitions often address attitudes, beliefs, and values, Reason's (1998) approach
considers these subcomponents and how they drive an organization in a particular
fashion. Reason (1997) identifies four critical subcomponents to safety culture: a
reporting culture, a just culture, a flexible culture, and a learning culture. These four
subcomponents work together to create an informed culture, which Reason (1997) views
as being synonymous with a safety culture.
Reporting Culture. A reporting culture is one in which there is a strong
willingness to participate and contribute to collecting safety-related data through hazard
reporting systems (Reason, 1997). The FAA (2015a) and ICAO (2009) both list the
inclusion of a voluntary, anonymous reporting system as a fundamental and crucial
component of an SMS. Moreover, Robertson (2016) has shown a strong connection
between SMS implementation, a confidential hazard report system, and safety culture.
Similarly, Dekker (2012) highlights the critical role reporting systems play in risk
management and accident avoidance for organizations.
Just Culture. There is significant research on the intricacies of a “just” culture
(Dekker, 2009, 2012; Dekker & Breakey, 2016; Frankel et al., 2006; Lawrenson &
Braithwaite, 2018). Reason (1997) defines a just culture as “an atmosphere of trust in
which people are encouraged, even rewarded, for providing essential safety-related
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information-but in which they are also clear about where the line must be drawn between
acceptable and unacceptable behavior” (p. 195). Much of the research on just culture
focuses on the challenges behind differentiating acceptable and unacceptable behavior
(Dekker, 2009) and what happens to those that cross the line beyond into the realm of
unacceptable behavior (Lawrenson & Braithwaite, 2018). While it has been shown that
organizations can improve through just culture practices by encouraging their employees
to report weaknesses without fear of reprisal (Frankel et al., 2006), complexity is added
when considering the influences of national culture on the perception of just culture
(ICAO, 2009; Liao, 2015).
Flexible Culture. A flexible culture relates to the concepts of HROs and
resilience. Reason (1997) describes a flexible culture as one that can shift between
hierarchal organizational structures to flatter structures when faced with emergencies to
accommodate the extent of the emergency, high-tempo environment. This ability to adapt
to emergencies and similar unforeseen circumstances is a hallmark of HROs and allows
these organizations to operate safely when faced with disruptions (Provan et al., 2020).
Having the ability to adapt, as opposed to resist, to disturbances is viewed as a desirable
quality to ensure resilience (Woods, 2015).
Learning Culture. A learning culture refers to “the willingness and the
competence to draw the right conclusions from its safety information system, and the will
to implement major reforms when their need is indicated” (Reason, 1997, p. 196). This
approach changes the perception of accidents and incidents from potentially being
viewed as shameful events but encourages them to be viewed as opportunities to learn
(Liao, 2015). When safety data is contributed and collected, the lessons learned from this
24

data's conclusions should be implemented in changes to procedures or similar variations
(Mearns et al., 2013).
Informed Culture. Reason (1997) posits that the four aforementioned
subcomponents (i.e., reporting, just, flexible, and learning) create an informed culture. In
an informed culture, all employees know an organization's safety status and priorities
(Wang, 2018). Wang (2018) states that an informed culture is accomplished through two
steps: individuals know the difference between acceptable and unacceptable behavior,
and most errant behaviors can be identified and reported without fear of reprisal.
Positive and Negative Safety Cultural States
Multiple sources allude to positive or favorable cultural states as well as negative
or unfavorable cultural states (FAA, 2015a; Patankar & Sabin, 2010; Wiegmann et al.,
2004). In fact, it is suggested that all organizations have a safety culture, but the dominant
state of the safety culture exists on a continuum and can be viewed from a positive or
negative perspective (FAA, 2015a; Gibbons et al., 2006). Negative safety culture would
exist when the contributing components of safety culture (e.g., reporting culture, just
culture) work against the organization instead of for the organization. Some additional
cultural states can be said to exist that represent these negative cultural states, such as
blame culture or secretive culture (Patankar & Sabin, 2010).
These cultural states are, in a way, the reverse or opposite of their respective
positive representative. For instance, Reason (1997) described a reporting culture as a
strong willingness to participate and contribute to collecting safety-related data through
hazard reporting systems. When organizational personnel do not willingly participate and
contribute to collecting safety-related data, a secretive culture can prevail. Similarly,
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when a just culture is not present, the opposite manifestation would be considered a
blame culture (Patankar & Sabin, 2008). These secretive and blame cultures do not
encourage communication of systemic problems or latent failures, which are considered
counterproductive to safety and overall positive safety culture (Patankar & Sabin, 2010).
Organizations can also be described along a spectrum between three culture
models that describe the nature by which they process information: generative,
bureaucratic, and pathological (Westrum, 2004). These models also will describe the
nature by which organizations respond to information. These models can help understand
how leadership and the organizations as a whole manage power and awareness of
potential issues.
Generative Organizations. When the concentration is on the mission itself
instead of persons or positions, a generative culture can emerge (Westrum, 2004). These
organizations experience high levels of cooperation, messengers are training, risks are
shared, bridging encouraged, failure results in inquiry, and novelty is implemented
(Westrum, 2004). This cultural model represents an organization that puts power- and
rule-oriented behavior aside. When there is a response to failure, the organization
responds with a global fix and inquiry into the situation to determine a root cause
(Westrum, 2004).
Bureaucratic Organizations. Rule-oriented organizations can be categorized as
bureaucratic (Westrum, 2004). These organizations can be characterized by being having
modest cooperation, messengers are neglected, narrow responsibilities, bridging is
tolerated, failure results in seeking justice, and novelty creates problems (Westrum,
2004). The response to failure or anomaly is a public relations response and local fix.
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These two characteristics are described as an organization providing a response that puts
the message “in context” of the events as to frame it in a manner that reduces the negative
appearance of the failure. Moreover, in contrast to a generative organization, bureaucratic
organizations will not seek a global fix. Instead, the bureaucratic organizations will
merely address the issue at the local level without performing further inquiry into
potentially related issues that could result in similar failure cases.
Pathological Organizations. The last of the three culture models proposed by
Westrum (2004) is the pathological organization. These organizations are power-oriented
and are characterized by having low cooperation, messengers are “shot,” responsibilities
shirked, bridging discouraged, failure results in scapegoating, and novelty is crushed
(Westrum, 2004). When anomalies occur, the reaction from the organization is
suppression and encapsulation (Westrum, 2004). These responses imply that the
organization will actively stop or even punish individuals looking to bring information
regarding anomalies forward. Moreover, the messengers that attempt to bring this
information forward will be isolated to avoid sharing that information, and no fix is
implemented.
Predictive, Proactive, and Reactive Organizations. The work done by Westrum
(2004), which identified three cultural models or stages (i.e., generative, bureaucratic,
and pathological), was later expanded to add two more stages: proactive and reactive
(Hudson, 2007). Considering these five stages on a spectrum, the progression would
follow from one to the other as follows pathological, reactive, bureaucratic/calculative,
proactive, and generative (Hudson, 2007). It should be noted that the term calculative was
used in place of bureaucratic. Calculative organizations refer to those who have systems
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in place to manage all hazards but have not gotten to a point where they use these tools to
attempt to anticipate safety problems (i.e., proactive) (Parker et al., 2006). While reactive
organizations give the appearance that they care about safety, however, they do not use
their resources in an attempt to anticipate safety issues and merely deploy these resources
after an accident or other safety issues arise after the fact (Parker et al., 2006).
ICAO (2009) addresses the concepts of reactive, proactive, and predictive
organizations as part of their implementation phases. In phase II of SMS implementation
under ICAO (2009) guidance, an organization would utilize safety management
processes in response to threats but not to the extent that the organization can anticipate
or predict potential incidents or accidents. Phase III entails the implementation of these
proactive and predictive elements (ICAO, 2009). These elements are forward-looking in
nature. The mechanisms being implemented will use data collection and analysis tools to
direct attention to threats that have not resulted in an incident or accident yet, but the
potential risk is present. These tools utilize statistical analysis of data that would not
indicate system threats on an individual basis, but when viewed in the aggregate, can
identify these threats (ICAO, 2009). An example of such a method would be flight data
analysis (FDA). The data being analyzed is not specific to incidents or accidents but can
provide insight into potential system threats that could manifest in an incident or accident
if not acted upon by safety personnel.
Safety Culture vs. Safety Climate
Safety culture and safety climate are terms that are sometimes used
interchangeably and have been found to have similar definitions in some instances
(Wiegmann et al., 2004). However, work has been done to distinguish between these two
28

terms (M. D. Cooper, 2000; Guldenmund, 2000; Wiegmann et al., 2004). A clear
distinction between these two terms is necessary in order to be able to measure or assess
either phenomenon.
Guldenmund (2000) proposed a model that accounts for the differences between
safety culture and safety climate. Based on this model, safety climate represents the
attitudes of organizational personnel instead of the assumptions of personnel, which is
representative of organizational culture (Guldenmund, 2000). Guldenmund (2000) also
argues that the emphasis when assessing organizations should be placed on the
assumptions, or safety culture, as that is thought to be explanatory of the attitudes. This
concept is based on the three-layer model proposed by Guldenmund (2000). Since the
organization's implicit assumptions represent the core of the model, the outer layers of
the model would be subject to influence by the core. These outer layers include more of
the explicit elements, which include attitudes and these attitudes are representative of
safety climate (Guldenmund, 2000).
Wiegmann et al. (2004) approach the distinction of safety culture and safety
climate by analyzing numerous definitions of each term. From this analysis, some
common themes were noted in the research literature:
1. Safety clime is a psychological phenomenon that is usually defined as the
perceptions of the state of safety at a particular time;
2. Safety climate is closely concerned with the intangible issues such as
situational and environmental factors; and
3. Safety climate is a temporal phenomenon, a “snapshot” of safety culture,
relatively unstable and subject to change (Wiegmann et al., 2004).
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Wiegmann et al. (2004) suggest that the distinction between safety culture and
safety climate is analogous to personality states versus traits. Using this analogy can
provide insight into the temporal nature of a safety climate. Since personality states can
manifest in temporary states such as anger, that is more akin to safety climate. That is
also due to the fact that personality states are subject to current circumstances. In
contrast, personality traits are more enduring and are not subject to the same level of
fluctuation. This enduring concept is more in line with safety culture (Wiegmann et al.,
2004).
Cooper's (2000) work on developing a safety culture model took safety climate
into account when addressing the methods by which to assess safety culture and safety
climate. The determination to measure safety culture or safety climate will dictate the
tools and mechanisms by which to assess. If dealing with attitudes and perceptions, a
safety climate survey would be appropriate (M. D. Cooper, 2000). This implies that
safety climate is more geared toward attitudes and perceptions, while safety culture is
more concerned with antecedents, behaviors, and consequences (M. D. Cooper, 2000).
Assessing Safety Culture
Wiegmann et al. (2004) introduce the limitations of assessing safety culture and
begin their analysis by introducing two primary assessment methods: qualitative and
quantitative. Each of these strategies includes different types of assessments within the
broader category. For instance, qualitative assessment can include employee
observations, focus group discussions, historical information reviews, and case studies
(Wiegmann et al., 2004). Quantitative assessments typically include highly structured
interviews, surveys and questionnaires, and Q-sorts (Wiegmann et al., 2004). Each
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method has its strengths. Qualitative methods can obtain intensive and in-depth
information, while quantitative methods are often easier to use and, specifically, useful
when performing cross-sectional comparisons (Wiegmann et al., 2004).
Another consideration proposed by Wiegmann et al. (2004) is the validity of the
measurement tools and specifically construct and discriminant validity. Construct validity
ensures that the instrument being used measures what it is intended to measure
(Wiegmann et al., 2004). Construct validity is usually demonstrated through repeated
applications, the phrasing of specific questions during an interview, or reflecting an
enduring organizational trait on a survey (Wiegmann et al., 2004).
Discriminant validity refers to an instrument's power to differentiate between
organizations or groups that possess different levels of safety (Wiegmann et al., 2004).
While some form of objective indicator (such as accident frequency) may be considered
ideal, this metric is not necessarily valid in the context of HROs given the low frequency
of these events (Wiegmann et al., 2004). Therefore, Griffin and Neal (2000) suggest
looking at safety compliance behavior and employee participation as objective safety data
sources.
Griffin and Neal (2000) refer to safety compliance and safety participation
variables holistically as safety performance. A key distinction is made between safety
compliance and safety participation, as they are suggested to discriminate between two
distinct behaviors. These distinctions aim to discriminate between prescriptive
compliance instead of behaviors that contribute to the greater organizational context.
Safety compliance refers to prescriptive behaviors, and an example of such behavior is
following the policies on personal protective equipment (PPE). Safety participation refers
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to individuals who actively participate in a safety meeting and potentially encourage
colleagues to do the same. Safety participation is said to enhance the team's safety, the
work environment, or the organization as a whole (Griffin & Neal, 2000).
Patankar and Sabin (2010) propose one additional safety culture assessment
method beyond the aforementioned qualitative and quantitative methods: quasiexperimental. When randomization is not possible, a quasi-experimental approach may
be appropriate in an attempt to determine causality when a proper experimental design
would be ideal, according to Creswell (as cited in LaPoint, 2012). A quasi-experimental
design can be utilized when an intervention is performed, and the measurement of its
effect on an outcome variable is desired. This method was utilized by LaPoint (2012) in
an attempt to determine if implementing crew resource management (CRM) training in a
healthcare setting affected attitudes toward safety and medical errors among perioperative
personnel. The quasi-experimental quantitative design results indicated a correlation
between CRM training and changes in safety attitudes (LaPoint, 2012).
It is essential to keep the goal of a safety culture assessment in mind. The
assessment is not meant to simply determine whether an organization has a safety culture
or not, but to determine the extent of shared or conflicting norms perceived by
individuals in an organization (Grote & Künzler, 2000). The FAA (2015a) shares this
perspective with their SMS guidance in that they proclaim all organizations have a safety
culture, but this culture exists on a continuum between positive and negative safety
culture.
Organizational Culture. Safety culture is considered a sub-set of the broader
organizational culture (Booth & Lee, 1995). Hopkins (2006) addresses this from the
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perspective that while safety culture is often subject to different interpretations and
definitions, organizational culture suffers from less variation in definition and
measurement. Specifically, some definitions of culture emphasize the way people think
(i.e., values), and others emphasize how people behave (i.e., practices). Hopkins (2006)
posits neither an emphasis on values or practice results from a conflict but points to what
is being emphasized with the assessment. Hopkins' (2006) conclusion is that
organizational culture must be included when considering safety culture.
One study that looked at these varying levels of cultural influences addressed how
organizational climate impacted group climate and safety performance (Brondino et al.,
2012). One finding showed that improving organizational climate significantly improved
co-worker and supervisor safety climate perceptions at the individual and group level
(Brondino et al., 2012). Another significant finding was the different influences coworkers had on one another when compared to supervisors. Co-workers' perceptions
played a stronger mediating role in safety climate than did supervisors (Brondino et al.,
2012). Further investigation into these lateral relationships is suggested.
Safety Behavior. Safety behavior refers to two different constructs: safety
participation and safety compliance. This breakdown is based on work from Borman and
Motowidlo (1993), who proposed that there are two majors components of performance:
task performance and contextual performance (as cited in Griffin & Neal, 2000). The use
of safety behavior as an outcome variable in the study of safety culture and SMS to
include safety participation and safety compliance has been used in multiple recent
studies (Adjekum, 2017; Chen & Chen, 2014; Neal & Griffin, 2006). Assessing safety
behavior is included in much of this research due to its relationship to safety climate and
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accident rates. It is suggested that safety climate predicts safety behavior, and safety
behavior has an effect on accident rates (Neal & Griffin, 2006).
Another behavioral component that will be included in the current research is that
of safety reporting behavior. Effective safety reporting is a critical component of an
effective SMS (FAA, 2015a; ICAO, 2009). Trust in a confidential safety reporting
system is a sign of positive safety culture (Robertson, 2016). Determining ways to
improve or increase safety reporting behavior is considered a necessary and worthwhile
research topic to improve the performance of SMS (Jausan et al., 2017).
Safety Culture in Collegiate Aviation. Safety culture and safety climate have
been actively studied for years (Gao et al., 2013; Liao, 2015; Taylor & Thomas III, 2003;
Wang, 2018). There has also been extensive research performed on safety culture and
safety climate in industries outside aviation (Barbaranelli et al., 2015; Brondino et al.,
2012; Fugas et al., 2012; Groves et al., 2011; Kapp, 2012; Neal et al., 2000; Stemn et al.,
2019; Wu et al., 2010). An area of research that is developing is safety culture in
collegiate aviation and similar flight training organizations (Adjekum, 2014, 2017;
Adjekum et al., 2016; Chiu et al., 2019; Dillman et al., 2010; Gao & Rajendran, 2017;
Robertson, 2016). This research area requires further investigation and a review of some
of the key findings that have laid the foundation for the proposed research.
Freiwald et al. (2013) performed one of the first safety culture assessments in
collegiate aviation, and this was in response to some significant hull losses that warranted
a more in-depth investigation. This analysis utilized a quantitative instrument called the
Commercial Aviation Safety Survey (CASS) for the quantitative portion of their
sequential mixed-method explanatory research. The CASS was initially developed and
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validated in commercial aviation (Gibbons et al., 2006). The CASS is designed to assess
the overall safety culture for a given organization through five constructs: organizational
commitment to safety, managerial involvement in safety, employee empowerment,
accountability system, and reporting system (Gibbons et al., 2006). Six schools were
assessed via the CASS for this research, and one of the significant findings was a lack of
accountability (Freiwald et al., 2013). Through the quantitative and qualitative analysis, it
was perceived that pilots should avoid hazards since it was in their best interests. Another
interesting finding was that many of the respondents believed that reporting systems were
critical, but many of the respondents had not participated in it themselves (Freiwald et al.,
2013). It was suggested that the implementation of SMS and safety culture should be the
result of these findings.
Adjekum et al. (2015) performed a cross-sectional assessment utilizing a new
instrument developed from the CASS, referred to as the Collegiate Aviation Perception
of Safety Culture Assessment (CAPSCAS). The CAPSCAS assessed six dimensions:
Formal Safety, Informal Safety, Operations Interactions, Organization Commitment,
Aviation Department Safety Record, and Safety Behavior (Adjekum et al., 2015). Some
of the findings from their quantitative analysis included safety reporting behavior that
could be predicted by safety culture perceptions, and respondents' age was a significant
predictor of safety reporting behavior (Adjekum et al., 2015).
Adjekum (2014) used the CAPSCAS in an assessment of a single collegiate
aviation program to determine if SMS implementation affected safety culture
perceptions. This analysis utilized four major scales: Formal Safety Program, Informal
Safety Program, Operations Interaction, and Organizational Commitment (Adjekum,
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2014). The findings suggested that the year group had an effect on safety culture
perceptions among students (Adjekum, 2014). This suggested that students that have
been in the program longer have a better understanding of safety culture within the
institution as opposed to newer students without the same level of experience or
exposure. Another finding was the variance between domestic and international students
(Adjekum, 2014). The international students did not have a favorable perception of safety
culture when compared to the domestic students.
The effect of national culture is not unique to collegiate aviation. Liao (2015) has
found similar effects when assessing Chinese and Western pilots' differences regarding
just culture, reporting culture, and learning culture. Liao (2015) utilized a mixed-method
approach, including a questionnaire directed at measuring perceptions of just culture,
reporting culture, and learning culture. Interviews were performed for the qualitative
assessment (Liao, 2015). Findings suggested cultural differences between Chinese and
Western pilots concerning trust and satisfaction when implementing just culture,
reporting culture, and learning culture (Liao, 2015). The Western pilots were more
satisfied with these safety culture components, while Chinese pilots were not as
accepting. Moreover, the Chinese showed strong influences of power distance and a
traditional hierarchy of authority, which affected their willingness to report—especially
superiors (Liao, 2015). Reporting culture is vital for overall positive safety culture
(Reason, 1997), and Liao (2015) acknowledges the challenges of power distance need to
be addressed for Chinese pilots to improve the safety culture.
In addition to national culture effects, the year group is another effect that has
been shown in other research literature when assessing safety culture in a collegiate
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environment. Gao and Rajendran (2017) assessed students from an Australian collegiate
aviation program using a self-constructed instrument. Their instrument identified four
themes: safety reporting culture, safety reporting procedures, organizational culture
practice, and general safety knowledge (Gao et al., 2013). When performing a more indepth analysis, they found that first-year students had a more positive perception than the
students who have been in the program for longer. The vertical mingling of the students
was suggested as a means to integrate these differing perceptions (Gao & Rajendran,
2017).
Adjekum et al. (2016) evaluated the effects of safety culture perceptions
concerning non-aviation students. Positive safety culture is desirable throughout a given
organization as a whole and should not be limited to a particular subsection of employees
(M. D. Cooper, 2000). Adjekum et al. (2016) sought to investigate safety culture
perceptions for Air Traffic Control (ATC), management, and Unmanned Aircraft
Systems (UAS) students. This study also sought to continue investigating age or year
group effects and utilized the CAPSCAS instrument, which provided further insight into
the relationships posited by the instrument. The findings suggest a relationship between
non-flight majors and the general trends, attitudes, and perceived safety values in their
collegiate program (Adjekum et al., 2016). This finding suggests that interaction with
flight majors influences safety culture perceptions for the non-flight majors and supports
the need to include non-flight majors in safety training and other related safety promotion
activities.
Another significant finding from this study was the influence of response and
feedback (Adjekum et al., 2016). Providing feedback and providing the feedback
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promptly was shown to have a strong relationship with safety behavior, which includes
the process of filing safety reports. This effect relates to age/year-group effects in that
younger students receive their initial safety training and may feel more inclined to
participate in the safety program by filing safety reports. However, lack of response and
feedback may lead to students not seeing the value in filing the safety report, which could
explain the age/year-group effects observed of older students showing a reduction in
safety reporting behavior.
Adjekum et al. (2016) also found relationships between safety values, safety
fundamentals, and reporting frequency. Safety fundamentals had a strong effect on safety
values, and while safety values were not found to be a strong predictor of reporting
frequency, safety fundamentals were found to predict reporting frequency (Adjekum et
al., 2016). The lack of predictive power safety values had concerning reporting frequency
suggested a more complex relationship between safety culture and reporting frequency.
Adjekum et al. (2016) suggested this could be attributed to other confounding variables,
socio-cultural bias, or hazard observability/identification coupled with motivation.
Given the importance of participation in reporting systems and related safety
behavior, Dillman et al. (2010) investigated perceptions surrounding reporting systems
and why some students in collegiate training institutions fail to file a hazard report for
actions or any other hazardous condition a safety department would need. Two collegiate
aviation programs were utilized, and a total of 254 students participated in the
quantitative study. Their findings suggested a lack of time, ridicule from others, and
embarrassment from peers were driving forces for students not participating in the
provided reporting systems. It was noted that more than 50% of respondents reported not
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having experienced a reportable event, but this was acknowledged to possibly be
attributed to inexperience (Dillman et al., 2010).
Chiu et al. (2019) did not study safety culture specifically. However, they
attempted to determine if there was a difference in perceived safety valuation between
flight students versus general Australian pilots and attempting to find a predictive model
for Australian students or recently trained pilots’ valuation of safety (Chiu et al., 2019).
The definition of safety valuation in this contest referred to how participants valued three
sub-cultures (i.e., just culture, reporting culture, and learning culture) (Chiu et al., 2019).
Neither of the research questions resulted in significant findings, but it was noted that this
study was performed within a specific culture (i.e., Australian flight training). It was
suggested that similar studies be performed in different cultures to evaluate any potential
cultural influences. There was one significant finding between Engagement as a predictor
of safety valuation. Engagement considered individuals’ level of engagement with their
training organization/employer (Chiu et al., 2019). The Engagement construct
investigated the perceptions of flight instructors and other organizational personnel caring
for students, encouragement for development, other students committed to quality work,
opportunities provided to learn and grow, and the presence of “school friends” at the
institution. Chiu et al. (2019) concluded that much more research is needed to investigate
the extent of engagement's influence and the need to perform this same research in other
settings.
Another point of interest within the study of safety culture and safety behavior is
planned unsafe behavior. Fogarty and Shaw (2010) sought to research this by exploring
potential mechanisms explaining planned unsafe behavior through various constructs.
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Their works builds upon the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991, as cited in Fogarty
& Shaw, 2010, p. 1546). Fogarty and Shaw (2010) used the theory of planned behavior to
conceptualize their model, which included management attitudes, own attitudes, group
norms, and work pressure as variables to measure how they affect intention to violate,
which could lead to violations. The potential for work pressure to directly have an effect
on violations was also built into the model. Their model was able to show the effect of
management attitudes and group norms as direct and indirect predictors of violation
behavior. These findings could be beneficial for addressing issues with violations in their
organization.
SMS: An Overview
While SMS is being mandated at the airlines (FAA, 2015b) and recommend for
corporate operations (NTSB, n.d.), there is no current requirement to have an SMS for
GA practitioners. Collegiate aviation falls under the definition of GA and does not have a
mandate for SMS guidance. Therefore, if a GA organization wishes to pursue and
implement an SMS, they have the option to choose from different possibilities. Currently,
two primary regulating bodies oversee SMS implementation: the FAA and ICAO.
SMS can vary in how it is implemented and the entity that will provide oversight
of the SMS (FAA, n.d.-a; NBAA, 2017). While there may be differences in
implementation and oversight, the overarching goals of any SMS are based on similar
principles. Stolzer et al. (2016) offer a comprehensive definition of SMS, “A dynamic
risk management system based on quality management system (QMS) principles in a
structure scaled appropriately to the operational risk, applied in a safety culture
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environment” (p. 22). Moreover, Stolzer et al. (2016) state that SMS is a dynamic risk
management system at its core.
Despite the differences in implementation and oversight, there are many
commonalities between SMS types. A brief review of these differences and
commonalities will be provided. This could provide a GA organization the background to
make an informed decision on which direction to take their organization when beginning
the implementation of an SMS.
SMS Studies
Remawi et al. (2011) wanted to investigate the effects of SMS implementation on
employee attitudes toward unsafe acts. They hypothesized that SMS implementation at an
airport would improve safety attitudes when testing two different airports. One airport
was being used as the experiment in that this airport was undergoing SMS
implementation, and then a control airport where no SMS implementation was taking
place was used for comparison purposes. A safety culture survey was administered to
participants from both locations in two phases to test changes to the participants' attitudes
toward safety across time. The findings supported their hypothesis. SMS's introduction
resulted in improved perceptions from the two phases on safety rules, supportive
environment, personal risk appreciation, work environment, and involvement (Remawi et
al., 2011b). It was suggested to continue efforts in measuring changes in these
perceptions over time. Longitudinal studies and their need are commonly cited among
SMS research (Adjekum, 2017; Adjekum et al., 2016; Chen & Chen, 2014).
Given the push for SMS implementation as a mandate in multiple settings such as
the airlines (FAA, 2015b), a scale to measure the essential dimensions is warranted. Chen
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and Chen (2012) sought to develop such a scale to evaluate the company’s SMS
performance. Five factors were identified in their analysis: documentation and
commands; safety promotion and training; executive management commitment;
emergency preparedness and response plan; and safety management policy (Chen &
Chen, 2012). These findings can be used by airlines and similar organizations when
undergoing the process of SMS implementation when looking to gauge employee
perceptions of how SMS concepts relate to the employees’ work. This tool can be used
by management to determine how well the SMS performs based on their employee
perceptions.
Since pilot behavior is considered a key factor for safety performance, Chen and
Chen (2014) sought to analyze multiple antecedents that are suggested to influence pilot
behavior. Three factors were considered for the model: Perceived SMS Practices,
Morality Leadership, and Self-Efficacy. Safety Motivation was also included to assess
the mediating effect. The outcome variable was safety behavior, which is broken down
into two constructs: Safety Compliance and Safety Participation. This proposed model
considers the organizational, group, and individual influences on safety behavior.
Perceived SMS Practices were shown to affect both safety behavior outcome variables
directly and were further strengthened by the mediating role of safety motivation.
Morality Leadership did not have any direct effects on safety behavior factors. However,
Morality Leadership was found to positively influence Safety Motivation, which fully
mediated the relationship between Morality Leadership and both safety behavior
variables. Self-Efficacy, the individual influence level, was shown to have direct positive
effects on both safety behavior variables and experience a strengthened relationship when
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mediated through safety motivation. These findings can be used by safety professionals
as guidance when attempting to implement SMS policies and determine best practices for
improving safety behavior.
While the FAA (2015b) is pushing for SMS to be implemented, ongoing research
is needed to measure such systems' effectiveness. Brady and Stolzer (2016) performed
some initial work in this field by utilizing the approach of Input-Output (IO) economics
theory along with Data Envelope Analysis (DEA). While IO has been used primarily in
economic fields, it is suggested based on the literature that IO concepts can be applied to
practically anything that is a system (Brady & Stolzer, 2016). DEA uses the inputs and
outputs to determine the efficiency of the effectiveness of decision-making units
(DMUs), in which these measurements of efficiency may be compared to best-observed
performance (Brady & Stolzer, 2016). The initial findings supported the efficacy of such
a method to evaluate SMS implementation in different organizations. In the sample,
inefficiencies were able to be identified to give feedback and direction to the
management of where these inefficiencies exist to improve the SMS. This initial work
was performed on a small sample of subjects, and a larger sample is required further to
validate the use of such an evaluation method.
Stolzer et al. (2018) continued to explore the use of DEA as a method to measure
the effectiveness of SMS. Interviews were initially conducted on Subject Matter Experts
(SMEs) in SMS. The findings from these interviews and relevant research literature were
used to develop a survey instrument to collect the data necessary to utilize DEA. Once
the collected data was validated, DEA models were developed and tested to measure
SMS effectiveness across the sampled organizations. The findings supported the notion
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that DEA may be used for evaluating SMS effectiveness in organizations. The results
were able to show efficiencies in different organizations. Such data could be useful for
management and top-level personnel when determining where to allocate resources to
improve their SMS.
Moreover, these evaluative methods are in response to the lack of guidance from
regulatory bodies, such as the FAA, that have not provided methods for measuring SMS
effectiveness. The findings from Stolzer et al. (2018) are promising, but they are based on
the findings from a small sample. Further research is needed across a larger sampling
pool to add to the validity of the proposed instrument and DEA models for effectiveness
measurement.
SMS, Safety Culture, and Collegiate Aviation
Collegiate aviation programs are beginning to pursue SMS for various reasons,
including, but not limited to, proactive measures to improve safety and safety culture or
to meet increasing accreditation standards from accrediting bodies. Further research into
the relationship between SMS implementation and safety culture is needed—especially in
collegiate aviation, where the research is limited (Adjekum, 2017; Mendonca & Carney,
2017).
Adjekum (2017) has performed some of the initial research into factors that
measure the latent construct of SMS initiative and has proposed a measurement model to
assess the relationships between SMS initiative, transformational safety leadership, selfefficacy, and the outcome variable safety behavior measured by safety compliance and
safety participation when mediated by safety motivation in a collegiate aviation setting.
Under the SMS initiative, two factors were identified: SMS policy implementation and
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SMS process engagement (Adjekum, 2017). SMS Policy Implementation refers to the
organizational leadership's implementation practices and strategies to ensure the SMS
initiative's effectiveness, and SMS Process Engagement refers to the degree of
involvement and acceptance of organizational personnel towards the SMS initiative
processes.
Adjekum (2017) also found various significant relationships in the proposed
measurement model assessing the relationships between SMS initiative, transformational
safety leadership, self-efficacy, and the outcome variable safety behavior measured by
safety compliance and safety participation, when mediated by safety motivation. SMS
policy was noted to have shown importance in the study, consistent with previous SMS
studies (e.g., Chen & Chen, 2014). It should be noted that the final measurement model
with the best goodness-of-fit indices split SMS Initiative into the two aforementioned
factors: SMS Policy Implementation and SMS Process Engagement. SMS Policy
Implementation was found to have a significant direct effect on Safety Motivation, a
significant direct effect on Safety Compliance, and a more substantial total effect on
Safety Compliance when mediated by Safety Motivation. SMS Process Engagement had
a significant direct effect on Safety Participation and an even more substantial effect
when mediated by Safety Motivation. However, there was no significant direct effect of
SMS Process Engagement on Safety Motivation or Safety Compliance. These findings
can support collegiate aviation programs in guiding their SMS policy development by
showing these policies' effect on components such as Safety Motivation, Safety
Compliance, and Safety Participation.
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Other findings were related to the other constructs being test in the proposed
measurement model: Self-Efficacy and Transformational Leadership (Adjekum, 2017).
Self-efficacy refers to people's beliefs in their ability to influence events that affect their
lives (Bandura, 2010), and Transformational Leadership is defined as “leadership that
inspires and motivates followers to achieve outcomes beyond expectations and helps
followers grow and develop by responding to their individual needs,” (“Transformational
Leadership,” n.d.). Chen and Chen (2014) had included Self-Efficacy in their
measurement model, which was shown to have effects on Safety Participation and Safety
Compliance. At the same time, Barling et al. (2002) and Zohar (2002) have shown the
effects of Transformational Leadership on safety climate and safety behavior,
respectively.
Adjekum (2017) findings regarding Transformational Leadership showed a direct
negative effect on Safety Motivation. It was suggested this could be attributed to chief
instructors and other senior staff that exhibit high transformational leadership traits,
which could result in front-line individuals (i.e., students in the case of collegiate
aviation) developing a sense of complacency and assuming inherently safe systems. This
was an exciting finding and perhaps counter-intuitive, which suggests further research
needed in other settings. Transformational Leadership was also shown to have a direct
positive effect on Safety Participation, and despite a negative effect on Safety Motivation,
a positive total effect was found between Transformational Leadership and Safety
Participation when mediated by Safety Motivation (Adjekum, 2017).
Safety Motivation was the last construct variable to be discussed in the
measurement model. Safety Motivation was found to directly affect the two outcome
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variables of Safety Compliance and Safety Participation (Adjekum, 2017). These findings
suggest beneficial effects from providing positive reinforcement, awards, public
recognition, and other promotional material to encourage Safety Motivation, which will,
in turn, are shown to have positive effects on Safety Compliance and Safety Participation.
SMS Types
FAA SMSVP. A GA organization, such as a collegiate flight training program,
may pursue SMS through the FAA’s SMSVP program (FAA, n.d.-b). This option does
not require any formal membership to the governing body and follows guidance
published within the Flight Standards Information Management System Volume 17
(FAA, 2019a). The GA organization will use this guide to structure its SMS and
determine what elements are needed to meet the FAA’s standard.
There are several steps in the process of getting an SMSVP accepted by the FAA.
The phases include Preparation Phase, Certificate Management Team (CMT)
Implementation Plan Review Phase, Documentation Validation Phase, Design
Demonstration Phase, Administrative Process Phase, and Continued Operational Safety
(COS) (FAA, 2019a). Furthermore, the certificate holder will pass through multiple
categories denoting their progress: Active Applicant, Active Participant, and Active
Conformance (FAA, 2019a).
Preparation Phase. The Preparation Phase of implementing an SMSVP will be
initiated by the certificate holder sending a letter or email to the SMS Program Office
(SMSPO). This will trigger coordination between the certificate holder and Certificate
Management Team (CMT) to commit to SMS implementation. Also, the SMSPO will
provide materials to the certificate holder and CMT to review.
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The certificate holder and CMT will need to meet together with a representative
from the SMS Implementation Support Team (IST) for an initial workshop. This
workshop is designed to familiarize both the certificate holder and CMT with SMSVP
principles. These include Program Tracking and Reporting Subsystem (PTRS) and Safety
Assurance System (SAS), Data Collection Tools (DCT), best practices and lessons
learned, and communication with the SMSPO (FAA, 2019a). Moreover, the workshop
will provide information on organizational concepts and considerations, description of
the SMSVP standard, description of the service provider SMS tools, the SMSVP
implementation, and validation processes, SMS “Active Participant” acknowledgment,
and COS oversight expectations (FAA, 2019a).
The certificate holder will also generate an implementation plan as part of this
Preparation Phase (FAA, 2019a). The implementation plan is described as a roadmap to
conforming to the SMSVP standards (FAA, 2019a). The implementation plan will cover
the relevant section from the SMSVP standard, a brief narrative where processes conform
to the SMSVP Standard or what actions the certificate holder will take to comply,
identification of specific employees by title with implementation responsibilities,
estimated target dates expectations will be met, and estimated target dates the certificate
holder will be ready for CMT design demonstration phase (FAA, 2019a). This
implementation plan is to be submitted to the CMT within 12 months of the initial
workshop with the ultimate goal of getting SMSVP acceptance within three years.
CMT Implementation Plan Review Phase. Upon receipt of the certificate holder's
implementation plan, the CMT will begin to review the plan. This initial review entails
the CMT checking the certificate holder’s plan against the SMSVP standard to ensure it
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addresses all sections and is in conformance (FAA, 2019a). This review process can
result in an acceptable or unacceptable conclusion.
An acceptable conclusion implies that the CMT has found the certificate holder’s
implementation plan was comprehensive of all the required elements and met the SMSVP
standard. This will initiate the CMT to begin the Validation Project Plan (VPP) (FAA,
2019a). The VPP is designed based on the implementation plan submitted by the
certificate holder. Given the resources and processes identified in the certificate holder's
implementation plan, the CMT will design the VPP to address those elements to allow
the certificate holder to validate its processes. A meeting between the CMT and the
certificate holder will take place to review the VPP. This meeting requires both the
certificate holder and CMT to agree on the terms of the VPP. If there are discrepancies
regarding the standards or method of validation, the SMSPO will get involved to resolve
any disagreements. Once the implementation plan and VPP are agreed upon, both will be
submitted to the SMSPO for review.
An unacceptable implementation plan could result due to a variety of reasons. If
the implementation plan is unacceptable, the CMT will notify the certificate holder in
writing to explain the deficiencies (FAA, 2019a). A meeting between the certificate
holder and CMT could take place to review the discrepancies, if necessary. Again, if
there is a disagreement between the certificate holder and CMT, the SMSPO will
intervene to resolve these disagreements.
Once the SMSPO has received the implementation plan and VPP, the SMSPO
will perform a quality review (FAA, 2019a). The SMSPO will ensure the expectations
and plans within the implementation plan and VPP are realistic and appropriate for the
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organization's scope seeking SMSVP acceptance. The SMSPO will consider the size,
scope, and complexity of different organizations when reviewing these plans.
Organizations of different sizes will have different resources available, which will lead to
different processes at each organization. However, any organization will still need to
show they can meet all of the SMSVP standards. For example, a smaller organization
may utilize one team for all risk management processes, where larger organizations may
have separate teams for separate functional groups. Once the SMSPO has agreed the
certificate holder’s implementation plan meets the SMSVP standard, the certificate
holder’s status will be updated to “Active Participant.”
The certificate holder may be managed, and their SMSVP progress tracked
through one of two FAA systems: PTRS or SAS (FAA, 2019a). The CMT utilized these
systems to validate the progress being made by the certificate holder as they complete
different steps along their path to SMSVP acceptance to allow the SMSPO to track the
progress. Both systems are meant to provide a means for data collection and oversight of
the functional groups being managed in a standardized manner. Currently, the FAA is
working to PTRS into SAS to provide a single oversight system (FAA, 2019b).
Documentation Validation Phase. The CMT will review the certificate holder’s
documentation to ensure it is designed adequately to include all the required SMS
activities and processes (FAA, 2019a). The certificate holder must perform their own
internal assessment and provide evidence to the CMT upon request to assist with this
validation process. In addition to the inclusion of activities and processes, the assignment
of critical responsibilities to applicable personnel and the use of appropriate language in
the guidance is to be addressed. Concerning the appropriate language, this refers to using
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passive language that may be included in manuals. For instance, the SMS guidance being
drafted by the certificate holder should not use passive language to describe actions
required to occur. This could include a statement regarding the required safety or hazard
reports. The certificate holder should phrase this statement in a clear, affirmative manner.
Safety or hazard reports will be filed is an example of an affirmative use of language.
Safety or hazard reports should be filed is an example of passive language and should be
avoided.
Design Demonstration Phase. The certificate holder will now need to
demonstrate the processes that were described in their SMSVP documentation (FAA,
2019a). The certificate holder will have to show that their processes are being applied
operationally and are working as designed. Similar to the documentation validation
phase, the design demonstration phase will require the certificate holder to show evidence
of their internal assessments to the CMT upon request. The certificate holder should
perform their internal assessments to validate their processes and show that they are
working.
The CMT will record evidence and report its findings using the data collection
tools (DCT) (FAA, 2019a). The CMT will update the respective oversight and tracking
system (i.e., SAS or PTRS). The CMT will be using their VPP previously agreed upon
between the CMT and certificate holder for the demonstration phase. The extent of the
demonstrations expected will be dependent upon the size and scope of the operation
being performed by the certificate holder. Processes that apply organization-wide may be
performed once, while processes that may have some variance may be demonstrated from
those different perspectives.
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The CMT must complete two demonstrations in collaboration with the SMSPO,
which include the SMS Accountable Executive Review Design Demonstration and SMS
Safety Risk Management (SRM) (Organisational) Design Demonstration (FAA, 2019a).
The Accountable Executive is required to participate in this demonstration either in
person or virtually. Successful completion of these two steps is required in order to close
out the CMT’s VPP.
Administrative Process Phase. This final phase is primarily for documenting and
closing out the previous steps of the SMSVP acceptance process. The CMT will record
and enter all required documentation into the appropriate oversight and tracking system
(i.e., SAS or PTRS). The SMSPO will perform a quality review of the material and
ensure all steps have been completed. Once satisfactory, the certificate holder’s status
will be updated to “Active Conformance.” (FAA, 2019a).

Figure 3. Diagram of the FAA SMSVP acceptance process.
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International Business Aviation Council (IBAC). Another option to implement
SMS within GA organizations, such as collegiate aviation, is to pursue the IS-BAO
standard through IBAC based on ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs)
(IBAC, n.d.-b). One immediate difference between pursuing the SMS through the FAA’s
SMSVP program and IS-BAO is cost. IS-BAO requires membership and fees in order to
be certified through IS-BAO. However, pursuing IS-BAO has some advantages,
including generic manuals organizations can alter to meet the specific needs of their
organization and advisors to assist with developing SMS principles in pursuit of the ISBAO standard.
The certification process is also different for IS-BAO. IS-BAO follows three
distinct auditing levels for certification, similar to that of the FAA’s SMSVP, but they
differ in their purpose and scope (IBAC, n.d.-a). IS-BAO certification begins by
purchasing a membership to the service, which initiates a six-step process in pursuit of
Stage I of III (IBAC, n.d.-a). These three stages reflect the level of SMS implementation
within the organization:
1. Stage I: confirms that the SMS infrastructure is established and that safety
management activities are appropriately targeted,
2. Stage II: ensures that safety risks are being effectively managed,
3. Stage III: verifies that safety management activities are fully integrated into
the operator’s business and that a positive safety culture is being
sustained (IBAC, n.d.-b).
In pursuant of Stage I certification, an organization will need to complete a sixstep process designed to provide the necessary foundation for a given organization to
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achieve higher certification (IBAC, n.d.-a). These six steps include purchasing the
standard, attending a two-day workshop, conduct a gap analysis, defining procedures and
acceptable risk levels, integrate the processes, and, finally, complete the Stage I audit
(IBAC, n.d.-a). This audit is at the expense of the organization and not included in
registration fees. However, the team of auditors is approved and provided through IBAC
(IBAC, n.d.-a).

Stage-I

Stage-II

Stage-III

Figure 4. Diagram showing the progressive auditing stages of IBAC IS-BAO SMS.
Summary
This literature review serves as a foundation for the background of the current
study. This was not a comprehensive review of all literature on safety culture and SMS.
This review was meant to address the relevant research that will be most applicable to the
present study. There is a need for additional research into safety culture and SMS in
collegiate aviation, given the relatively new push for collegiate aviation programs to
adopt and implement SMS programs in their institutions. Attention to how this relates to
and affects safety culture is needed to ensure SMS's effective implementation without
causing any potential adverse effects.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
The current study will utilize a concurrent embedded mixed-method approach.
Some of the current research is building upon prior research to add to the previously
developed models and concepts' validity. Similar methods from this prior research will be
utilized to add to these prior research efforts' validity and reliability. Further use of
quantitative and qualitative methods will be utilized to address previously unanswered
questions while also seeking to address new research questions.
Adjekum (2017) proposed a model to evaluate the relationship between SMS
initiative, self-efficacy, transformational safety leadership, and safety behavior mediated
by safety motivation. The current study will utilize the final measurement model, which
differed from the initially proposed model in that two factors were identified to have
composed the SMS initiative construct. Therefore, the final measurement model utilizes
SMS policy engagement and SMS process engagement (see figure 1). The original
research was performed at a single collegiate aviation program. The current study will
test the model across multiple collegiate aviation programs with differing SMS levels and
types.
Past research has shown year-group effects (Adjekum, 2014; Adjekum et al.,
2016; Gao & Rajendran, 2017) and differing perspectives on safety culture based on
nationality (Adjekum, 2014; Liao, 2015). The current research will investigate these same
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variables across multiple universities to determine variations in safety behavior
perceptions. Much of the past research has been limited in terms of the number of
institutions being assessed. The current research seeks to broaden the scope of the
assessment by evaluating multiple collegiate aviation programs in this cross-sectional
assessment to add to the generalizability of these prior findings. Moreover, the crosssectional approach to include multiple universities will provide the opportunity to explore
any potential effects of different types of SMS programs or levels of SMS
implementation. The collegiate aviation programs included in the current study all have
different levels and types of SMS implementation. This current research will explore any
potential effects of these varying levels and types of SMS implementation.
Qualitative methods will be necessary in order to address the third and final
research question. Exploration as to the potential mechanisms as to why there may be
variations in perceptions regarding safety behavior based on year-group, SMS type, and
SMS implementation is needed. Saldana and Omasta (2017) have suggested that
interviews seek to explore a subject's personal experiences related to the study topic
based on their values, attitudes, and beliefs. Therefore, a qualitative assessment of any
potential variation on perceptions of safety behavior based on the aforementioned
variables could prove beneficial for collegiate aviation programs seeking SMS
implementation at their institutions.
Research Design
Concurrent Embedded Mixed Method Approach
The current study is using a combination of quantitative and qualitative tools for
data collection and analysis. This study's primary scope is to expand upon prior research
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performed in collegiate aviation by adding to the validity and reliability of the proposed
model (Adjekum, 2017). The current study will test this proposed model across multiple
collegiate aviation programs with similar research goals. Additionally, past findings will
be assessed at these varying institutions (e.g., year-group effects, nationality effects) to
ensure these findings were not unique to the sampled populations in those particular
studies (Adjekum, 2014, 2017; Adjekum et al., 2016; Gao & Rajendran, 2017; Liao,
2015).
Moreover, these past findings will be investigated through a qualitative approach.
Prior research has found quantitative effects from SMS implementation, but aspects of
these effects cannot be quantified. Morse has noted, “…qualitative data could be used to
describe an aspect of a quantitative study that cannot be quantified” (as cited in Creswell,
2009, p. 215). SMS implementation's effects, potential effects of varying levels/types of
SMS, and year-group effects need to be investigated to a deeper level. A qualitative
approach can provide this deeper level of analysis.
Methodology
Population
The quantitative and qualitative components of this study utilized different
sampling pools. The quantitative portion sought respondents from various collegiate
aviation programs. These programs offer 14 CFR Part 141 flight training and are UAA
members. The student populations at these institutions vary from as low as 300 students
to as high as 1,500. Moreover, these institutions all have varying levels and types of SMS
programs. Some are in the earlier stages of building formal SMS programs, and others
have well-established, recognized SMS programs. Seeking programs with these varying
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SMS implementation levels and type was necessary, given the research goals of
determining any potential effects based on these factors.
The qualitative portion of the study was limited to three of the four
aforementioned collegiate aviation programs. It was initially desired to perform the
qualitative analysis at all four institutions, but access to the fourth organization was not
granted for that portion of the research. Therefore, three of the four initially proposed
collegiate aviation programs were utilized for the qualitative portion. These three
organizations still provided a mix of varying levels and types of SMS implementation
and type. One school is just beginning the pursuit of FAA recognized SMSVP and is
considered in the active applicant stage, the second school has reached the level of active
conformance through the FAA’s SMSVP, and the last school has reached the third and
final stage of IS-BAO’s SMS program. This sampling pool will provide insight into any
potential differences in the SMS type. Additionally, the varying levels of implementation
(e.g., active application versus active conformance) will provide insight into any
potential differences based on the implementation level.
Sampling Procedures
Power Analysis and Sample Size Selection
When considering the sample size for SEM, the model itself must be considered.
A base recommendation of minimum sample size may not suffice for specific models.
Kline (2011) suggests considering the model parameters when determining an adequate
sample size as simpler models may work with a smaller sample. More complex models
require a larger sample. More specifically, Jackson (2003) offers the N:q rule, which is
applicable when using the maximum likelihood estimation method and suggests a ratio of
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20:1. That is 20 participants to each parameter in the model. Given that the proposed
model has 14 parameters, a minimum suggested sample size of 280 participants is
suggested. The proposed sampling pool of four collegiate aviation programs, some of
which have over 1,000 students, should provide ample participants for analysis.
Given that one of the variables being tested with this study is year-group effects,
it is prudent to include students and CFIs. Many students will graduate and get hired by
their respective institutions as CFIs to build time. This increased time at a given
institution provides insight into the potential year-group effects. This sample will provide
responses from first-year students to graduated students working as CFIs who may have
been at the institution for longer than four years.
During the qualitative portion, it is desired to seek two first-year students or
sophomores, two juniors or seniors, two CFIs, and a leader from the safety department at
each institution. This is to gather data from multiple perspectives at different critical
points in one’s tenure at a given institution. First-year students and sophomores will have
the least amount of exposure to the organization’s culture and provide that initial
perspective. Juniors and seniors will most likely have been at the institution for many
years, assuming the student is not a transfer, and has likely experienced a shift in safety
culture perceptions. Moreover, assuming the CFI was a previous student and has been at
the institution for potentially longer than four years, this perspective, along with the
change in the role, can provide insight into any potential effects associated with either of
those factors.
Interviewing safety leadership will provide a point of comparison from which to
consider the student and CFI perspectives. Since those in safety leadership positions are
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responsible for promoting their institution's safety culture, they will provide insight into
their desired cultural perception. A comparison between those in safety leadership
positions to the frontline personnel (i.e., students and CFIs) will provide useful insight
into how and how well safety culture is being promoted, communicated, and instilled
throughout each organization.
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection
The Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviewed the research protocols proposed
and approved. Representatives from each institution selected to participate in the study
were contacted to request access to students, CFIs, and safety leadership personnel for
this study. These representatives provided letters of assurance that they would grant
access to all of the requested individuals.
For the quantitative portion of this study, a link was generated to grant access to
an anonymous survey generated using Qualtrics®. This link was distributed to the
representatives previously contacted at each institution to be sent to the student and CFI
body. The link was also distributed to different UAA representative members for
distribution. Each representative sent the link to their respective students and CFI body
through institutional email. Each participant would access the link through their
institutional email. Upon opening the link, they would review the terms of the survey and
provide implied consent by opting to complete the survey. Once in the survey, each
participant has the option to cease participation at any point without any potential for
negative repercussions. The responses to any completed surveys were stored online
through the Qualtrics® server as approved by the IRB.
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Subjects for interviews were recruited similarly to the quantitative survey. A
request letter was sent to each institution representative for distribution to the student and
CFI body. The letter was then emailed to the student and CFI population at each
institution requesting volunteers to participate in semi-structured interviews. Participation
was voluntary, and there were no incentives offered in any case.
A combination of stratified, deliberate, and convenience sampling was utilized.
Stratified sampling was used when there are several potential candidates to select from
for the interviews. This was to attain the desired distribution of multiple year-group
candidates along with CFIs. An individual considered to be in a safety leadership position
was interviewed at each institution except for the authors. Given the author's employment
at one institution and a recent role in a safety leadership position, it was deemed
redundant to interview someone within the institution.
Volunteers selected were sent an invitation to conduct the interview through
Zoom®. Before conducting the interview, each participant was sent a copy of the
interview outline to review the questions ahead of time. Participants were also sent the
consent forms for electronic signature before conducting the interviews. The interviews
were recorded and transcribed for analysis. After the interview was complete, each
participant was sent a copy of the transcript to validate the transcript's contents.
The transcripts were analyzed through a combination of automated tools included
in NVivo® and manual coding. “Coding is the process of organizing the material into
chunks or segments of text before bringing meaning to information” (Rossman & Rallis,
1998, p. 171, as cited in Creswell, 2009). Moreover, Saldana and Omasta (2017) describe
the process of coding as, “Coding is symbolizing—the condensation of a datum into a
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richer, more compact form of meaning” (p. 181). Interview transcripts generate a high
quantity of data and coding allows the researcher to condense the data into manageable
portions with the intent to elicit themes and meaning from the data.
Field notes and analytic memo writing were additional methods employed for the
qualitative analysis. Field notes, or jottings, while performing an interview can
supplement the audio-recordings to add to data by recalling details or facts the audiorecordings are incapable of capturing (Saldana & Omasta, 2017). Analytic memos are
described as “…reflective narratives that expand and expound on observations by taking
researchers’ thinking and writing up a notch. With memoing, researchers attempt to
transcend the descriptive of their field notes and venture into richer analytic connections
and insights” (Saldana & Omasta, 2017, p. 97). Analytic memos were written after each
interview, or sometimes after a series of closely conducted interviews, with the purpose
of developing connections. After multiple interviews, reflecting on common themes to
determine associations between the interviewees' data helped the researcher condensing
the qualitative data to derive themes effectively.
Demographic Details
The demographic information collected from the survey included year-group (i.e.,
first-year, sophomore, junior, senior, or not applicable), gender, international student
status, University attending or employing the participant, type of SMS in place or
pursuing, and functional group (i.e., student, permanent employee/staff, or faculty).
These demographic variables were selected to perform further analysis on past findings
regarding year-group effects (Adjekum, 2014; Adjekum et al., 2016) and nationality
effects (Adjekum, 2014; Liao, 2015). The IRB approved these demographic variables and
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data collection methods. Given the large sample size between multiple universities, it is
unlikely that personal identifying information could be derived from the responses. No
personal identifying information was collected outside of the aforementioned
demographic details.
Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs
All of the constructs being used in the measurement model will be discussed
below. A five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree or 1 = never
to 5 = always) will be used to measure all scales. Upon completing the data collection,
composite reliability will be assessed. A minimum value (α = 0.70) will be utilized in all
cases, which is considered acceptable (Field, 2018).
SMS Process Engagement and SMS Policy Implementation
The first two scales to be assessed are the result of prior work by Adjekum
(2017). This foundational work sought to determine the latent factors that measure the
latent construct of the SMS initiative (Adjekum, 2017). The original scale was developed
from various sources directed toward assessing SMS (Chen & Chen, 2012, 2014;
Transport Canada, 2005). Some of the questions were modified from their original form
to better suit the scope of collegiate aviation. For instance, the use of “Dean” or
“University President” when referring to the Accountable Executive was changed.
Using exploratory factor analysis (EFA), two factors emerged: SMS policy
implementation and SMS process engagement (Adjekum, 2017). For the current study's
purposes, six items were selected with the highest factor loadings to represent each scale
based on the findings in the original study (Adjekum, 2017). All items selected had
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strong factor loadings, and additional confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) will be
performed to validate consistency.
Safety Motivation
The safety motivation scale was initially developed by Neal et al. (2000) and has
since been used in other studies involving the assessment of safety culture and climate
(Adjekum, 2017; Neal & Griffin, 2006). Neal and Griffin describe the safety motivation
scale as “…the extent to which individuals viewed safety as an important part of their
work life” (2006, p. 948). Safety motivation will be used as a mediating measure between
the two aforementioned SMS scales (i.e., SMS process engagement and SMS policy
implementation) and the outcome variables (i.e., safety behavior as measure by safety
participation and safety compliance and safety reporting).
Safety Behavior
Safety behavior refers to two different constructs: safety participation and safety
compliance. This breakdown is based on work from Borman and Motowidlo (1993), who
proposed that there are two majors components of performance: task performance and
contextual performance (as cited in Griffin & Neal, 2000). Griffin and Neal (2000) use
this definition to apply safety compliance and safety performance concepts to represent
safety behavior. Safety compliance refers to activities that need to occur to exist for a safe
work environment. In comparison, safety participation refers to voluntary activities that
may enhance safety but is not considered to have the same direct effects that safety
compliance has on a safe working environment.
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Safety Reporting
Multiple studies have been performed on the relationships between different
variables on collegiate aviation safety reporting behavior (Adjekum et al., 2015, 2016;
Robertson, 2016). A strong reporting culture is considered to be a sought after cultural
state (Dekker, 2012; FAA, 2015a; ICAO, 2009; Reason, 1997). Therefore, measuring the
different effects variables can have on reporting culture is key to encouraging further
safety advancements.
The safety reporting behavior scale in the present study is based on prior work
from Adjekum (2014). Adjekum (2014) developed the CAPSCAS, and this instrument
included questions to assess the reporting system within the Formal Safety Program
scale. The CAPSCAS and reporting system questions are based on work from Gibbons et
al. (2006), in which the CASS was developed. Modifications have been made to the
CAPSCAS since its conception (Adjekum et al., 2015, 2016).
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CHAPTER IV:
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Demographic Information
After four weeks, the survey was closed. Four hundred and fifty-one (n = 451)
responses were considered for analysis, which completed the survey past the consent
page. Sixty (n = 60) responses were deleted due to not consenting to the survey and did
not provide adequate data for analysis. Any missing data were replaced using a
regression-based single input method. A regression-based imputation method replaces
missing scores with a “…predicted score using multiple regression based on non-missing
scores on other variables” (Kline, 2011, p. 58). A limitation of single-imputation methods
is that they tend to underestimate error variance, especially if the proportion of missing
observations is relatively high (Vriens & Melton, 2002, as cited in Kline, 2011).
Considering the student group responses, ninety-four (n = 94) first-year students,
seventy-seven (n = 77) sophomores, eighty-two (n = 82) juniors, one hundred thirty-four
(n = 134) seniors, and sixty-four (n = 64) “Other” were recorded. The respondents in the
“Other” category included CFIs, students who have completed their course work but
were still flying, and graduate students. Those in the “Other” category do not fit into a
traditional year group category as they do not retain traditional student status, but they do
continue to play a significant role within the collegiate aviation operation. Respondents
were also asked for their functional group. Three hundred seventy-seven (n = 377) were
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students, sixty-one (n = 61) were permanent employee or staff, twelve (n = 12) were
faculty, and one (n = 1) respondent did not provide their functional group status.
Respondents were asked to provide their highest flight certificate held. One
hundred twenty-seven (n = 127) respondents held a student pilot certificate, one hundred
ninety-eight (n = 198) held a private pilot certificate, forty-five (n = 45) held a
commercial pilot certificate, eighty (n = 80) held a CFI or Airline Transport Pilot (ATP)
certificate, and one (n = 1) did not answer this question. All the responses in this study
were from ten (n = 10) different collegiate aviation programs across the United States.
Respondents were also broken down by international student status and gender.
Three hundred sixty (n = 360) respondents were male, eighty-eight (n = 88) were female,
and three (n = 3) did not disclose their gender. Thirty-six (n = 36) respondents were
classified as international students, four hundred fourteen (n = 414) were domestic, and
one (n = 1) did not disclose their student status as being international or domestic. For the
purposes of this study, domestic students are those that are U.S. citizens or have alien
resident status.
Respondents were also asked to provide information about their SMS status. This
demographic question was meant to determine what type of SMS program their
institution was pursuing or currently had accepted and whether the respondents were
aware of this status. Two hundred forty-six (n = 246) answered as having or pursuing a
FAA accepted SMSVP, nine (n = 9) answered IBAC IS-BAO, one hundred eighty-eight
(n = 188) answered “Do not know,” seven (n = 7) answered “None,” and one (n = 1) did
not answer. See tables 1, 2, and 3 for demographic distributions.
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Table 1. Demographic variables Year Group, Flight Certificate Held, and Gender.
Variable

N

Percentages

Year Group
First-year student

94

20.8%

Sophomore

77

17.1%

Junior

82

18.2%

Senior

134

29.7%

Other

64

14.2%

Total

451

100%

Student

127

28.2%

Private

198

43.9%

Commercial

45

10.0%

CFI or ATP

80

17.7%

1

0.2%

451

100.0%

360

79.8%

Female

88

19.5%

Missing

3

0.7%

451

100.0%

Highest Flight Certificate Held

Missing
Total
Gender
Male

Total
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Table 2. Demographic Variables of International Status, SMS Status, and Functional
Group.
Variable

N

Percentages (%)

Yes

36

8.0%

No

414

91.8%

1

0.2%

451

100.0%

Are you an international student?

Missing
Total

What kind of Safety Management System (SMS) does your institution have or
currently pursuing?
FAA SMSVP

246

54.5%

9

2.0%

188

41.7%

None

7

1.6%

Missing

1

0.2%

451

100.0%

IS-BAO / Third Party
SMS
Do not know

Total

69

Table 3. Demographic Variables of Functional Group and University Attending.
Variable

N

Percentages (%)

377

83.6%

Permanent Employee/Staff

61

13.5%

Faculty

12

2.7%

Missing

1

0.2%

451

100.0%

What is your functional group?
Student

Total

What University do you attend for flight training or currently employs you?
Unknown

10

2.2%

University A

7

1.6%

University B

4

0.9%

University C

20

4.4%

University D

4

0.9%

University E

50

11.1%

University F

13

2.9%

University G

142

31.5%

University H

1

0.2%

University I

16

3.5%

University J

184

40.8%

Total

451

100.0%
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Quantitative Data Analysis and Validation
The quantitative data were downloaded from Qualtrics® into IBM SPSS Statistics
27® and IBM SPSS Amos 26 Graphics® for analysis. All analyses were assessed for
statistical significance at the 0.05 alpha level (2-tailed) unless otherwise specified. Given
the use of previously validated scales in the present study, Confirmatory Factor Analysis
(CFA) was used to determine whether scale items that measured various latent constructs
such as SMS and Safety Participation (SPB) are consistent with the researcher's
understanding of the nature of that construct. It was also used to test whether the research
data fit hypothesized measurement models of the relationships between study
constructs/variables. The reliability of the scale is tested using the composite reliability
method. Field (2018) recommends a value of 0.70 or higher when assessing reliability.
See Appendix F for a visual depiction of the final measurement model with regression
weights and Appendix G for a table containing the goodness-of-fit indices for the final
measurement model.
Additionally, convergent validity was assessed using the average variance
extracted method (AVE). Fornell and Larcker (1981) suggest a value above 0.50 when
assessing the presence of convergent validity. Discriminant validity was assessed by
comparing each AVE's square root with the correlation coefficients for each construct.
A first-order uni-dimensional CFA (Confirmatory Factor Analysis) was
performed on each construct explored in this study: SMS Policy Implementation
(SMSPol), SMS Process Engagement (SMSProc), Safety Reporting Behavior (SR),
Safety Compliance (SCB), Safety Participation (SPB), and Safety Motivation (SMot).
IBM SPSS Amos 26 Graphics® was used for this analysis to determine the goodness of
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fit indices and factor loadings. This first assessment resulted in post hoc modification to
the initial measurement model of the SMSProc construct. Some low factor loadings
affected the fitness of the model. The modification resulted in removing two items (Q4.5,
Q4.6), which had low loading from the original six. There were no other modifications
made to scale items.
Composite reliability was calculated for all items in the measurement model to
assess the reliability of the items on each scale. All items assessed were above the 0.70
thresholds except for SRB (α = .60). The relatively fair reliability of SRB could be due to
inadequate understanding and responses to the construct items by respondents or the low
number of items that explained the construct (3). These factors need to be considered
when making inferences using this SRB scale. Table 4 has the values of composite
reliability for all scales.
Descriptive analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics 27®. Descriptive
analysis included mean, median, standard deviation, standard error of the mean,
normality tests (kurtosis and skewness), and visual inspection of normal distribution
curves. High indications of kurtosis were observed for two variables: SMot (Safety
Motivation) and SCB. Given that regression-based single-imputation was used to replace
missing values, there is the possibility that a high frequency of common values reduced
the variance (Vriens & Melton, 2002, as cited in Kline, 2011). Visual inspection of the
histogram for these variables showed positive peaks near the normal distribution curve's
mean representative of these shared values. This is a limitation of any single-imputation
method for replacing missing data (Vriens & Melton, 2002, as cited in Kline, 2011). See
table 4 for all the descriptive statistics for the study variables.
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Table 4. Details of Descriptive Statistics of all the Study Variables
SMot

SPB

SCB

SR

SMSProc SMSPol

N

451

451

451

451

451

451

Mean

3.99

3.61

4.46

4.63

2.78

3.83

Median

4.07

3.61

4.55

4.63

2.78

3.96

0.249

0.538

0.379

0.755

0.523

0.685

-5.902

-0.958

-4.225

-1.041

-1.072

-2.379

0.115

0.115

0.115

0.115

0.115

0.115

59.489

2.079

28.625

1.024

1.356

6.087

Std. Error of Kurtosis

0.229

0.229

0.229

0.229

0.229

0.229

Composite Reliability

0.80

0.79

0.83

0.60

0.79

0.93

3

3

3

3

4

6

Std. Deviation
Skewness
Std. Error of Skewness
Kurtosis

Number of Items in Scale

Convergent validity was assessed using the AVE method (Fornell & Larcker,
1981). The AVE method is used to assess the amount of variance captured by the
construct in relation to the variance explained by error (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). The
values for all scales were above the 0.5 thresholds apart from SR (0.36). This suggests
evidence of convergent validity in the SR scale with other scales. Discriminant validity
was assessed by comparing the square root of each AVE with the correlation coefficients
for each construct. If the square root of each AVE is more than the correlation
coefficient, discriminant validity is believed to exist (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Based on
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the analysis, discriminant validity can be assumed. See table 5 for the values of AVE and
correlations.
Table 5. The square root of the AVE (diagonal) and correlations between constructs
(off-diagonal)
AVE

SPB

SMSPol

SMSProc

SR

SCB

SPB

0.56

0.746

SMSPol

0.68

0.205

0.823

SMSProc

0.50

0.094

0.219

0.698

SR

0.36

0.358

0.318

0.412

0.599

SCB

0.63

0.453

0.310

0.276

0.295

0.791

SMot

0.57

0.332

0.394

0.286

0.318

0.493

SMot

0.758

Question One
What are the strengths of the relationship between SMS process engagement, SMS
policy implementation, safety motivation, and the outcome variables safety behavior
measured by safety compliance and safety participation and safety reporting behavior
across multiple collegiate aviation programs?
After the construct and discriminant validity for constructs were determined, and
the reliability of scale items assessed, the next phase of determining the goodness-of-fit
for all measurement models was done. The Structural Equation Model (SEM) approach
was used to determine the fit of measurement models. A variety of fit indices are Chisquare (χ2), Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), Comparative Fit
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Index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), Normed Fit Index (NFI), and Incremental Fit
Index (IFI). All these values will be reported as part of the structural model assessment.
The chi-square (χ2) test is commonly reported. However, it is sensitive to sample
size (Vandenberg, 2006). Kline (2011) suggests that a significant chi-square test with
between 200-300 cases (n = 200-300) can be indicative of significant issues to reject the
model, but the current sample size is more than 450 cases.
RMSEA is another commonly reported statistic to assess model fit. The RMSEA
statistic is not sensitive to sample size like chi-square but can be sensitive to model
complexity (Brown, 2006). RMSEA of less than 0.05 is ideal, and greater than 0.10
would indicate issues (Kline, 2011).
The Bentler Comparative Fit Index (CFI) is another statistic often used. The CFI
is “an incremental fit index that measures the relative improvement in the fit of the
researcher’s model over that of a baseline model” (Kline, 2011, p. 208). The CFI statistic
can range from 0 – 1.0, and greater than or equal to 0.95 is considered an acceptable fit
(Kline, 2011).
The Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) is a non-normed fit index. The TLI can have
values outside of the range of 0 – 1.0, but it is ideal to have a value approaching 1.0
(Brown, 2006). Similar to CFI, if TLI is greater than 0.95, this is considered indicative of
a good model fit.
The last two statistics reported are the Normed Fit Index (NFI) and Incremental
Fit Index (IFI). NFI and IFI should be above .90; otherwise, it suggests the need for
model improvements (Bentler & Bonett, 1980). A combination of reported fit indices can
help with assessing the best model fit. According to Hu and Bentler (1999), using cutoff
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values of 0.95 for TLI and CFI in conjunction with a cutoff value close to 0.06 for
RMSEA seems to result in lower Type II error rates with acceptable costs of Type I error
rates.
An initial assessment was done on the hypothesized measurement model that
showed the relationships between the variables. The initial analysis of the fully mediated
measurement model did not yield adequate goodness-of-fit indices. See figure 5 for the
measurement model. Based on recommendations suggested by IBM SPSS Amos 26
Graphics® modification indices function, covariances were added between the error
terms to improve model fit.
Covariances were added between e2/e3, e2/e4, and e5/e6. Additionally, the direct
path from SMSProc to SPB was removed for theoretical reasons. SMSProc was expected
to have a higher predictive power as it relates to other scales; therefore, it was not
expected to see a significant impact between these SMSProc and SPB. Subsequent
iterations were done on the measurement model to improve the fit indices. Competing
models were evaluated, and the best-fitting model was selected.
IBM SPSS Amos 26 Graphics® did suggest further modifications (i.e., the
covariance between e3/e4), but these modifications were not implemented. When the
analysis was run with the covariance between e3/e4, model fit indices suggested an
overfit model, which is not conducive to hypothesis testing (Brown, 2006; Kline, 2011).
See Model II fit indices in table 6 and figure 6 for a graphic representation of the
overfitted model.
After making the adjustment suggested by IBM SPSS Amos 26 Graphics®,
model fit indices were improved to acceptable levels: χ2 (2, n = 451) = 6.188, CMIN/DF
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= 3.094, p = .045, NFI = 0.992, IFI = 0.994, TLI = 0.958, CFI = 0.994, RMSEA = .068
(.009 - .132). It was determined that this model showed the best fit for the data among the
other competing structural models and was used for hypothesis testing. See figure 7 for a
graphic representation of the final structural model showing the relationships between the
study variables.
Table 6 shows all reported goodness-of-fit statistics for the competing models.
See table 7 for a summary of the maximum likelihood estimates (MLE), standard error
(SE), critical ratios (CR), p-values, estimated effect sizes, and hypotheses of the final
measurement model with best goodness-of-fit. Table 8 contains significance values for
mediating effects and squared multiple correlations (R2) for effect size, which provides
the amount of variance explained by the predictor variables (Byrne, 2010).
Hypothesis Testing
This study seeks to address the effects of SMSPol and SMSProc on safety
behavior as measured by SCB, SPB, and SR. Additionally, the SMot mediating role on
the relationships between SMS components and the outcome variables measuring safety
behavior. The 14 hypotheses were assessed via SEM-PA. Standardized regression
coefficients will be reported throughout the results to show the effect the predictor
variables have on outcome variables.
Hypothesis 1. The first hypothesis tested the respondents’ perceptions of the
relationship between their collegiate aviation program's SMS process engagement and
safety motivation in the program. The results indicated that the relationship between
SMSProc and SMot was statistically significant (β = 0.243, SE = 0.020, C.R. = 5.737, p <
.001), and supported the hypothesis. The direct effect of SMSProc on SMot was .243.
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1.000

0.992

χ2 (2, n = 451) = 6.188, CMIN/DF = 3.094, p = .045
(Covary e2/e3, e2/e4, and e5/e6. Removal of
SMSProc --> SPB)

Model III

0.768

Model II

χ2 (4, n = 451) = 175.797, CMIN/DF = 43.949, p <
.001

Model I

NFI

χ2 (1, n = 451) = .200, CMIN/DF = .200, p = .655
(Covary e2/e3, e2/e4, e3/e4, and e5/e6. Removal of
SMSProc --> SPB)

Chi-square (χ2)

Iteration

Table 6. Goodness-of-Fit Estimates for Various Structural Models.

0.994

1.001

0.772

IFI

0.958

1.016

0.134

TLI

RMSEA

0.994 .068 (.009 - .132)

1.000 .000 (.000 - .096)

0.769 .309 (.271 - .349)

CFI

Figure 5. Model I – The fully mediated model.
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Figure 6. Model II – The overfit model.
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Figure 7. The final structural model with best-fit indices.
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Figure 8. Model III – The final structural model with standardized regression weights.
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SMSPol
SMSPol

<---

<---

<---

<---

<---

<---

<---

<---

SCB

SR

SPB

SCB

SR

SCB

SR

SMot

Note ***p<.000, **p<.001, *p<.05

SMSProc

SMSProc

SMSProc

SMot

SMot

SMot

SMSPol

<---

SMot

SMSPol

<---

SPB

Interactions

0.116

0.580

0.105

0.523

0.710

0.765

0.228
7.471

4.857

2.408

8.889

1.656

C.R.

3.830

3.954

0.020

5.737

0.055 10.484

0.028

0.132

0.067 10.661

0.102

0.047

0.024

0.015

0.137
0.057

0.037

S.E.

0.062

Estimate

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

0.016

***

0.098

P

Direct
Effect

0.243 0.243

0.401 0.401

0.145 0.145

0.172 0.172

0.466 0.466

0.359 0.359

0.206 0.206

0.103 0.103

0.376 0.376

0.080 0.080

β

0.000

0.042

0.113

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.065

0.175

0.000

0.135

Indirect
Effect

0.243

0.443

0.258

0.172

0.466

0.359

0.271

0.278

0.376

0.214

Total
Effect

Supported

Supported

Supported

Supported

Supported

Supported

Supported

Supported

Supported

Not

Hypothesis
Testing

Table 7. Estimates of Final Measurement Model of the Relationship Between SMSPol, SMSProc, SMot, SPB, SCB, and

Table 8. Indirect Effects - Two Tailed Significance and R2 Effect Size.
SMSProc
SMot

R2

SMSPol
...

...

0.245

SPB

0.006

0.006

0.160

SR

0.008

0.007

0.351

SCB

0.003

0.003

0.344

That is, due to the direct (unmediated) effect of SMSProc on SMot, when SMSProc goes
up by one standard deviation, SMot goes up by 0.243 standard deviations. Standardized
regression coefficients will be reported throughout the results to show the effect the
predictor variables have on outcome variables.
Hypothesis 2. The hypothesis tested the relationships between respondents’
perceptions of their collegiate aviation programs SMSProc and SCB. The results
indicated the that the relationship between SMSProc and SCB was statistically significant
(β = 0.145, SE = 0.028, C.R. = 3.83, p < .001), and supported the hypothesis. The direct
effect of SMSProc on SCB was 0.145.
Hypothesis 3. The hypothesis stated the relationships between respondents’
perceptions of their collegiate aviation program's SMS process engagement are related to
their safety participation. The final model did not have any relational pathway between
the two variables, and, therefore, the hypothesis was not supported.
Hypothesis 4. The hypothesis stated the relationships between respondents’
perceptions of their collegiate aviation program's SMS process engagement are related to
their safety reporting. The results indicated the that the relationship between SMSProc
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and SR was statistically significant (β = 0.401, SE = 0.055, C.R. = 10.484, p < .001), and
supported the hypothesis. The direct effect of SMSProc on SR was 0.401.
Hypothesis 5. The hypothesis stated that safety motivation mediates the
relationship between respondents’ perceptions of their collegiate SMS process
engagement and safety compliance. The results indicated SMot significantly mediated the
path between SMSProc and SCB. The indirect effect coefficient was 0.113 and was
statistically significant (p = .003). The standardized total (direct and indirect) effect of
SMSProc on SCB is .258. Due to both direct (unmediated) and indirect (mediated) effects
of SMSProc on SCB, when SMSProc goes up by one standard deviation, SCB goes up by
0.258 standard deviations.
Hypothesis 6. The hypothesis stated that safety motivation mediates the
relationship between respondents’ perceptions of their collegiate SMS process
engagement and safety participation. While the direct path from SMSProc to SPB was
not included in the final model, the mediated model showed statistical significance (p =
.006). The indirect effect coefficient was small (.087), and the standardized total (direct
and indirect) effect of SMSProc on SPB is .087. The results do support the hypothesis.
Hypothesis 7. The hypothesis stated that safety motivation mediates the
relationship between respondents’ perceptions of their collegiate SMS process
engagement and safety reporting. The results showed a statistically significant effect for
SM mediating the relationship between SMSProc and SR (p = .009). The indirect path
coefficient was .042, and the standardized total (direct and indirect) effect of SMSProc on
SR is .443. These results supported the hypothesis.
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Hypothesis 8. The hypothesis stated the relationships between respondents’
perceptions of their collegiate aviation program's SMS policy implementation are related
to their safety motivation. The results indicated a statistically significant relationship (β =
0.376, SE = 0.015, C.R. = 8.889, p < .001), and supported the hypothesis. The direct path
coefficient between SMSPol and SMot was .376. Due to the direct (unmediated) effect
of SMSPol on SMot, when SMSPol goes up by one standard deviation, SMot goes up by
0.376 standard deviations.
Hypothesis 9. The hypothesis stated the relationships between respondents’
perceptions of their collegiate aviation program's SMS policy implementation are related
to their safety compliance. The results indicated a statically significant relationship (β =
0.103, SE = 0.057, C.R. = 2.408, p = .016), and supported the hypothesis. The direct path
coefficient between SMSPol and SCB was .103.
Hypothesis 10. The hypothesis stated the relationships between respondents’
perceptions of their collegiate aviation program's SMS policy implementation are related
to their safety participation. The result did not indicate a statistically significant
relationship between SMSPol and SPB (p = .098) and did not support the hypothesis.
Hypothesis 11. The hypothesis stated the relationships between respondents’
perceptions of their collegiate aviation program's SMS policy implementation are related
to their safety reporting. The results indicated a statistically significant relationship
between SMSPol and SR (β = 0.206, SE = 0.047, C.R. = 4.857, p < .001), and supported
the hypothesis. The direct path coefficient between SMSPol and SR was .206.
Hypothesis 12: The hypothesis stated that safety motivation mediates the
relationship between their perceptions of their collegiate SMS policy implementation and
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safety compliance. The results indicated a statistically significant mediating role of SMot
between SMSPol and SCB (p = .003). The indirect path coefficient between SMSPol and
SCB was .175, with a total path coefficient of .278.
Hypothesis 13. The hypothesis stated that safety motivation mediates the
relationship between their perceptions of their collegiate SMS policy implementation and
safety participation. The results showed a statistically significant mediating effect of
SMot between SMSPol and SPB (p = .006). The indirect path coefficient between
SMSPol and SPB was .135, with a total effect of .214. Despite the direct path between
SMSPol and SPB not being statistically significant (p = .098), the mediated path through
SMot was statistically significant and supported the hypothesis.
Hypothesis 14. The hypothesis stated that safety motivation mediates the
relationship between their perceptions of their collegiate SMS policy implementation and
safety reporting. The results indicated a statistically significant mediating effect of SMot
between SMSPol and SR (p = .007). The indirect path coefficient between SMSPol and
SR was .065, with a total path coefficient of .271. These results supported the hypothesis.
Question Two
What are the differences in perceptions among the demographic variables (year
group, international student status, SMS status, and flight certification) on safety
behavior and safety reporting behavior across multiple universities?
A one-way between-subjects Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to assess
differences in the mean of perception scores for respondents on outcome variables based
on various demographical groups. Visual inspection of histograms shows a normal
distribution, but there was a higher representation of single values due to the data
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imputation. The Levene test for homogeneity was used before all tests to verify normal
variances among the data. If assumptions of normal variance could not be assumed, a
robust ANOVA will be used.
The first demographic group assessed was the year-group. The results indicated
that there was a significant difference on means score for SR based on year-group, F (4,
446) = 2.706, p = .001, η2 = .042. Since the sampling size between groups was slightly
different, Gabriel’s procedure was used for post-hoc analysis (Field, 2018). The post-hoc
analysis revealed that there were significant differences in mean reported scores on SR.
Seniors had a lower perception score (M = 4.41, S.D. = .82) than first-year students (M =
4.71, S.D. = .75), Sophomores (M = 4.81, S.D. = .67), and Other (M = 4.76, S.D. = .82).
Recall, the Other category included CFIs, graduated students still completing flight
training, and graduate students. The results suggest that sophomores had the highest mean
scores.
International student status was also assessed to determine any varying
perceptions on the outcome variables. Levene’s test of homogeneity was significant, F (1,
448) = 6.40, p = .012, therefore, an independent samples t-test with bootstrapping was
performed to address assumptions of normality (Field, 2018). . International students had
lower means scores (M = 4.32, S.D. = .92) as compared to non-international students (M
= 4.66, S.D. = .73). This difference, -.34, BCa 95% CI [-.67, -.03], was significant, t
(38.96) = -2.17, p = .036 which represented an effect of d = .75. This result suggests that
domestic students had better perception of SR than international students.
Respondents were asked to provide information regarding their university’s SMS
implementation status. This question was meant to determine if the school was actively
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pursuing a formal SMS (i.e., FAA SMSVP or IBAC IS-BAO), already had an SMS
implemented, was not pursuing a formal SMS, or did not know what their university’s
intentions were regarding intentions regarding SMS implementation. Notably, a
considerable proportion of respondents answered that they did not know their university’s
SMS implementation plans (n = 188).
A one-way ANOVA was run to determine if there were any differences in the
mean of responses to SCB, SPB, or SR based on this SMS status question. The results
suggested significant differences in the mean scores on SPB based on SMS status, F (3,
446) = 2.71, p = .045, η2 = .018. Post-hoc analysis using Hochberg’s GT2 procedure was
conducted, and it showed that respondents that answered Do Not Know (M = 3.52, S.D. =
.53) had significantly lower mean scores than respondents that indicated their institution
was pursuing a formal SMS through the FAA’s SMSVP (M = 3.67, S.D. = .54).
A one-way ANOVA was run to determine if there were any significant
differences in responses to the outcome variables based on respondents' flight certificates.
Respondents were asked to indicate their highest certificate to include Student, Private,
Commercial, and CFI or ATP. No significant differences were found based on this
demographic variable were found.
Question Three
Why are there variations in safety culture perceptions based on demographic
criteria?
Qualitative Data Analysis and Validation
All interviews were conducted remotely using Zoom®. Zoom® is a videoconferencing software that allows audio and video communication through an online
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platform. Zoom® creates a transcript of recorded meetings. The trustworthiness of
verbatim recorded transcripts was confirmed using the playback of audio recording. Upon
completing the initial validation, a copy of the transcript was sent to each participant for
their review and acceptance as true reflections of their views on interview questions.
After all respondents had validated the recorded transcripts, the transcripts were
imported into NVivo 12® for coding and theming. The transcripts were coded and
themed to address all qualitative research questions. These themes were then analyzed to
determine trends in participants' responses. Field notes and analytic memos were used in
conjunction with the interview transcripts to develop themes and conclusions from the
qualitative analysis.
The semi-structured interviews were meant to probe deeper into past findings.
One of these past findings to be addressed was year-group effects (Adjekum, 2014, 2017;
Adjekum et al., 2016; Gao & Rajendran, 2017). These past findings found differences in
safety culture perceptions across differing year-groups. The present study aims to
investigate why these effects exist and how positive safety culture can be developed more
efficiently.
Three primary areas were considered for the qualitative portion of this research:
safety culture, SMS implementation, and safety promotion and communication. The field
notes and memos aided in the analysis to reduce the data and derive themes. These
themes are provided below as they relate to the elements in question with these
interviews.
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Safety Culture
The first series of questions in the semi-structured interviews were aimed at
perceptions of safety culture. These questions were designed to gauge their overall
perception of safety culture at their institution, what factors have had the most influential
impact on their perception of safety culture, how their perception of safety culture may
have changed over time, and what their organization could be doing to improve how the
safety culture is perceived by students and CFIs.
The role of the CFI. There were two questions from the interviews that regularly
referenced the CFI's role in their responses on the perception of safety culture: How has
your perception of safety culture at your institution changed over time, and What has had
the most significant impact on your perception of safety culture. The CFI's role was more
frequently referenced compared to Directors of Safety, Accountable Executives, or the
presence of an SMS.
The students and CFIs that were interviewed would refer to how the CFI set the
example for behaving. While it was noted that those in Safety Leadership would advocate
for certain behaviors, the CFI had a more considerable influence over the day-to-day
behavior. Many of the interviewees had experienced multiple CFIs over their flight
training, which exposed them to various perspectives on how to approach safety. These
varying experiences further confirmed that the CFI significantly influenced the student’s
development of essential attributes of a safety culture, such as proactive hazard
identification and safety risk reporting during their time at their program.
The interviewees would sometimes reflect on differences in CFIs and how that
affected their own behavior. In some cases, a given CFI may show a disregard for
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particular safety policies or procedures, and that leads to a situation where such disregard
for existing safety policy by these CFIs adversely impacts the perceptions of their
students on the relevance of such policies and procedures in ensuring safety in flight
operations. Later, after transitioning to a new CFI, they would gain a new perspective.
This could be differences between instructors on the importance of safety reporting or the
risk associated with specific hazards in the flight training environment. The reflection on
their past experiences highlighted the influence of the CFI. Regardless of written policy
and procedure, the CFI's influence could supersede these policies and procedures
promoted by those in Safety Leadership positions.
The role of the CFI on safety culture also highlights the importance of people in
an SMS. Multiple interviewees noted how a written policy is not necessarily enough to
encourage the desired behavior. The people involved in the system must execute that
policy. This sentiment was echoed by students, CFIs, and those in Safety Leadership
positions. While a Safety Policy is a vital component of an SMS, it needs to be
understood and implemented by all organization stakeholders. Consider the following
quotes from flight instructors reflecting on their past CFIs and students reflecting on their
current experiences from varying institutions generating the theme for the Role of the
CFI:
Flight Instructor A:
“As a student, having an instructor submit an ASAP report was pretty significant
to seeing them do it you, you know, use the program when a mistake has been
made.”
Flight Instructor B:
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“Oh god, without a doubt, without a doubt, it's definitely [the CFI]. I feel like
even if you can't, if you got a student who wasn't very safety-oriented, I feel like if
you had the right CFI and the right mindset. I think you could change that, so
without a doubt the CFIs are that frontline, backline, middle on everything.
Honestly, at least in my opinion.”
Student A:
“I think maybe if there was more encouragement from our instructors. I know,
like in the beginning of my training. It's just at the beginning, my training is a lot
different than it is now, and I was with a different instructor at the time. So I think
the perception that I was given from that individual really shaped what I thought
to be a bother. And so it took something. It took something small happening and
me coming out and talking to safety individuals to realize that it's okay, and as
long as you're safe and it pertains to your safety that it's okay to do that and bring
that up rather than to not and hide it and have something worse happened to
you.”
Student B:
“That's where you have to have flight instructors that do that because the first
flight instructor I had always… he didn't want to admit his mistakes and you
always want to put these mistakes on students. So you kind of had this like, okay,
you don't want to. You don't want to seem stupid. You don't want to make
mistakes. But then I had a bunch of other flight instructors. After that, who were
kind of echoed that and they were great. And then it just kind of made you see
what it really was. So yeah, it's definitely having the flight instructors to iron out
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all the creases and give the students more of a look under a magnifying glass like
a more specific.”
Student C:
“I would say, like the biggest influence is instructors and students just because if
we don't abide by the... because it's, I mean, it does come from the top, but if it's
not being adhered to by like the I mean, there's only one Director of Safety and
then there's hundreds of flight students and instructors, you know, so the it's up to
the moving pieces more. So I'd say in terms of the day to day.”
The role of safety leadership. Students and instructors were interviewed across
varying points on their institutional experience. When asked who or what played the most
significant role in shaping their perception of the safety culture, the Director of Safety
was often cited as a critical individual. Although, Safety Leadership was admittedly not
as crucial of an influence as the CFI. Moreover, students earlier in their experience at a
given institution were more likely to reference those in safety leadership positions as
having a powerful influence on their safety culture perception. Once the students have
been in the institution for a longer time, the CFI took over as the predominant influencing
force for safety culture perceptions.
First-year and sophomore students at a given institution would reference safety
leadership as having the most profound influence. Upper-level students would reference
their CFI as having a more powerful influence. This seemed to suggest that a CFI’s
influence could overpower the influence of safety leadership. Even the CFIs that were
interviewed would refer to their past CFIs and how they influenced their behavior. This
finding supports findings from Brondino et al. (2012), where they suggested the stronger
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role co-workers play over supervisors when assessing safety climate perceptions. Their
findings suggested that co-workers' safety climate can reduce or cancel the effects of the
group level association between the supervisor’s safety climate and co-worker’s safety
climate (Brondino et al., 2012). This, along with findings from Chiaburu and Harrison
(2008), suggest that co-worker support was a better predictor of employee outcomes than
leader support.
The role of safety policy. The organization’s safety policy would come into
consideration when students and CFIs were asked how they would describe the safety
culture at their institution. Students and CFIs often mentioned that the policy clearly
articulated non-punitive reporting and just culture philosophy. The students and CFIs
relate the safety policy to the reporting system. This finding makes sense at an intuitive
level. Since the primary interaction students and CFIs have with the SMS is through
reporting, both groups relate their perception of the SMS and prevalent safety culture to
their collegiate programs' safety reporting system.
When asked if this policy were enough to encourage reporting, students and CFIs
both said it took time to build trust in the system to begin reporting. Despite a clearly
stated policy, it took additional influence to facilitate participation in reporting systems.
This additional influence was typically a first exposure to the reporting system through
their CFI or hearing of other student’s experiences. Again, the CFI seems to play a
critical role in shaping students' perceptions of the safety culture and encouraging
reporting behavior. Consider the following quotes from CFIs and students reflecting on
their initial exposure to the reporting system:
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Flight Instructor A:
“As a student, having an instructor submit an ASAP report was pretty significant
to seeing them do it for you, you know, use the program when a mistake has been
made.”
Student A:
“Actually, seeing how it remained anonymous and that it wasn't just you guys
saying it. You know, this is how we do it. But actually going through the process
once and realizing that. Because, you know, sometimes you don't trust the system
until you're actually going through the system, and that's probably what really
made me open my eyes, and I guess really trusting the whole procedure and
process.”
Once students and CFIs had made their first report and experienced the process,
they were more willing to participate in the future. This first exposure suggests a critical
component to encouraging reporting behavior from students and CFIs in collegiate
aviation. An emphasis from the CFI to students to file a report early on in training could
encourage a swifter adoption of reporting behavior.
Safety reporting feedback and safety behavior. Providing feedback for
submitted safety reports was noted as a perceived critical influence on the institutions'
safety culture by those in safety leadership positions. When students and CFIs participate
in the reporting system, it is viewed that those who take that time to report deserve
feedback for their effort. This, in turn, is believed to encourage future reporting.
Students and CFIs also addressed the importance of feedback. Feedback provided
by the safety office for reports filed by students and CFIs creates a positive indicator that
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their concerns are taken seriously by top-leadership. When discussing the role of
feedback, one student said, “It's probably just going to go sit on the desk and build dust,”
when commenting on the lack of feedback. When students and CFIs do not receive
feedback for their efforts to file a safety report, the adverse perception that nothing will
happen with that report is further enhanced. Providing a form of feedback could mitigate
this perception. One student said, “That helps me know whether it's going to be
continually pursued or not,” when discussing the effects of receiving feedback after a
safety report.
SMS Implementation
Given that many collegiate aviation programs are beginning to pursue formal
SMS programs (i.e., FAA SMSVP or IBAC IS-BAO), the following SMS
implementation questions were designed to gauge perceptions related directly to these
systems. Since institutions can pursue formal SMS programs through diverse sources,
some of the questions were meant to determine if there were any perceived differences in
safety culture based on these different programs. Students, CFIs, and safety leadership
personnel were interviewed from schools that had varying types and levels of SMS
implementation for this research.
There were also questions designed to assess how well students and CFIs
understood SMS. Those in safety leadership positions had a robust understanding, but the
question of how well students and CFIs understood it and how this may impact their
perception of safety culture was addressed. All interviewed were also asked if the SMS's
presence had a significant impact on their perception of safety culture.
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SMS type. Of all the students and CFIs interviewed between three different
collegiate aviation programs with varying levels and types of SMS programs, no student
or CFI accurately identified what kind of SMS they had in place or was pursuing.
Moreover, when students and CFIs were asked what kind of SMS they had, they would
reply with a description of the safety reporting system (e.g., non-punitive, voluntary). As
previously mentioned, when discussing the role of safety policy on student and CFI
perceptions of safety culture, students and CFIs view the SMS through the lens of their
role (i.e., reporting). Students and CFIs perceive that their role within the SMS is to
contribute safety reports, which seems to be how they relate to the SMS.
Those in safety leadership positions were able to discuss the type and level of
implementation of their respective SMS programs. When asked what role their SMS
played with their students and CFIs, none believed it was critical for students. The formal
elements of the SMS were viewed as more critical for those responsible for safety
processes. The SMS was thought of as a guide, and the people were responsible for
executing it.
One response that highlighted this perspective was, “So our SMS is literally just a
document. It doesn't define who… We could have the best document in the world, and it
does nothing for you if leadership doesn't follow it. If the students don't follow the
responsibilities within that. So it's a guide, but I don't think the document itself makes the
organization, how the organization uses the document that makes the culture actually
thrive and exists.” Another quote echoing this sentiment was, “It does more for those of
us to say [SMS]. It means a lot more to those of us in this office in our, in our
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management flight department management. To the student, I don't think it means
anything, or the instructor even.”
SMS knowledge and understanding. It was clear based on responses received
from students and instructors that their knowledge and understanding of what SMS is and
how it works is lacking. This is highlighted by student and CFI responses, indicating that
their SMS is “voluntary” or “non-punitive.” While these are attributes of a safety
reporting system, these do not represent the SMS. Safety reporting is one element, albeit
a critical one, of an SMS.
It should be noted that students and CFIs participating in the interviews were sent
a copy of the interview questions ahead of time to review and begin thinking through
their responses. In this case, students and CFIs were aware that they would be asked what
kind of SMS their institution had in place or was implementing. Despite being aware of
this question, still, no respondents were able to answer the question correctly. Some
admitted they did not know, and others answered by offering answers describing the nonpunitive or voluntary nature of the safety reporting system.
This finding shows a gap between the organization’s SMS status and frontline
stakeholder’s understanding of this status. Determining the effect of this gap was not the
scope of this research. Although, the prospect of improving SMS knowledge and
understanding as discussed with students and CFIs during interviews to gain their
perspective if they believed it would have an impact or not. For instance, one student
responded to the question of what effect a deeper understanding of SMS would have, and
they replied, “Yeah, probably. I think the more you learn about anything is gonna tie into
your performance.”
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Those in safety leadership positions agreed that there is potential to address the
gap between student and CFI SMS knowledge and understanding. All of those in safety
leadership positions acknowledged that their students and CFIs do not fully understand
everything that goes into their organization's SMS. Moreover, all acknowledged that
students and CFIs having a more profound understanding could impact their behavior or
perception of safety.
SMS impact on safety culture. Despite respondents being unable to explicitly
state the type of SMS implemented or being pursued at their institution, students and
CFIs were aware of SMS as an entity. Students and CFIs were aware of their
organization's safety policies and procedures. They were aware of these policies and
procedures' robust nature, which did influence their perception of safety culture.
According to respondents, having these policies in place had a positive impact on their
perception of safety and safety culture.
When students and CFIs were asked to describe this impact, responses often
alluded to a foundational influence. Moreover, the presence of the SMS was said to be an
initial primary influence early on in their flight training. To illustrate this point, one
respondent had the following response when asked what impact the presence of SMS had
on their perception of safety culture, “Now I will say that that has very foundational. I
mean, when you go into, you know, you're learning straight away from private pilot you
learn about SMS.”
Students and CFIs would occasionally allude to the high volume of policies and
procedures present at their institutions. They did not indicate that this had a negative
impact on their perception of safety culture. Instead, they acknowledged the presence of
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those policies and how it relates to SMS as being there for a reason. One respondent
highlighted the role of these policies by stating, “And I feel like that, that alone, knowing
that if I'm a student, knowing that or just me knowing that, that lets me know that we're
trying to set ourselves apart even more and doing more so that perception definitely in a
positive way would increase, I guess.”
Safety Promotion and Communication
This final area being addressed in the semi-structured interviews was directed at
determining how SMS is taught and how effective it is at promoting SMS. Themes arose
surrounding SMS training, formal versus informal SMS training, and the role of the
Accountable Executive. These will be discussed, and quotes will be provided.
SMS training. When discussing the extent of SMS training offered at different
institutions, those in Safety Leadership discussed classes that are offered which cover
SMS. There is typically some formal class or similar delivery method to provide SMS
training to students. Given that SMS training is considered a requirement by the FAA
(2015a), it is expected to have explicit training. Additionally, different collegiate
programs embed SMS training in dedicated safety classes as part of the curriculum and
ensure it is addressed on the flight training side.
The role of this initial safety training is not necessary to provide a robust
understanding of SMS to students as viewed by those in Safety Leadership positions.
Instead, this training is viewed to provide students with the necessary knowledge to
function within the SMS. This is the way to articulate the role of students in SMS. For
instance, one respondent stated, “That is literally it. They are. They are the eyes and ears
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of what we do. Day in and day out, because I am not sitting in a cockpit for 50 hours in a
week, the CFIs and the students are, and they are the ones that see it.”
The student responses would refer to these classes offered. However, when asked
if these classes played a vital role in developing their perception of safety culture, they
did not believe it was as important as other elements such as day-to-day interactions with
their CFI. The influence of CFIs, peers, and stories was typically cited as playing a more
important role in functioning with the SMS. For instance, one quote addressing the
impact of formal classes compared to interacting with their CFI stated, “I think they've
made it effect for sure, but I don't think it was: It wasn’t as profound as I would hope it
would have been, I think, that the CFI is still the foundation of that.”
Formal versus informal training. The discussion of the role of SMS training
with students and CFIs developed a theme around the way these students and CFIs learn
SMS. All students and CFIs referenced formal classes, but these were not viewed as
having the most profound impact on how they learned SMS and their role in the SMS.
This distinction can be viewed as a difference between a theoretical versus practical
approach to learning SMS. Thus, the theme of formal versus informal training.
Given the CFI's role in developing students’ understanding of SMS and their role
in SMS, this was thought of as the practical application of the concepts. Students and
CFIs would reference their interactions with their CFIs and how that shaped their
understanding of how the SMS worked. Many times, the students would refer to their
CFIs as being more like a peer. Learning from the example of CFIs and the stories CFIs
tell influenced how students developed their SMS understanding. This point was
articulated by one student when saying, “I think the theoretical side definitely comes
102

from the professors, but the practical side of seeing where the theoretical side needs to the
practical side is done by the flight instructors.”
The Accountable Executive’s role. SMS touts the importance of support from
the Accountable Executive as a critical element (FAA, 2015a; ICAO, 2009). Students and
CFIs were asked how well the relationships between top-level individuals and front-line
personnel are managed and what impact their relationships have on safety culture
perceptions. Students and CFIs would typically address salient individuals within their
institution that represent safety. This was usually the Director of Safety. Comments
would address how approachable these individuals are and the importance of an opendoor policy. These initial responses would not include those associated with the
Accountable Executive’s role.
When students and CFIs were asked what role the Accountable Executive would
play in their perception of safety, they did agree that it was crucial. The support from
these top-level individuals was necessary for the functionality of the SMS. It is believed
that this support has a “trick down” function, which is in line with the traditional topdown implementation of SMS (FAA, 2015a; ICAO, 2009). One quote that addressed this
concept stated:
“I think [the Account Executive] definitely plays a major role because if he didn't
care about safety. It wouldn’t trickle down: When you know I think we [the CFIs]
have the most influence directly but I don't think we would care about it as much
if we didn't have that the top leaders who were constantly talking about safety
how important safety is.”
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This concept seems to tie together the role of the Accountable Executive and the
CFI. While the CFIs seem to have a substantial amount of influence on students and
students’ development of SMS knowledge and safety culture, this is only possible with
the support of higher-level individuals—namely, the Accountable Executive. One student
participant highlighted this relationship well:
“So there's definitely a closer generally a closer connection between students and
flight instructors and because there's a close connection between them and you
know say higher-ups, they're more willing to listen to the flight instructor.”
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS
Discussion
This study sought to build upon past research into SMS and safety culture in
collegiate aviation programs (Adjekum, 2014, 2017; Adjekum et al., 2015; Gao &
Rajendran, 2017; Hasan & Younos, 2020; Robertson, 2016). SMS implementation in
collegiate aviation is still relatively in a stage of infancy, and few collegiate aviation
programs have managed to implement formal SMS programs recognized by a regulatory
body such as the FAA or an industry trade organization such as IBAC. Although, entities
such as AABI and UAA encourage SMS, and more programs pursuing formal SMS
programs will increase. This research seeks to assess current methods to evaluate these
programs' effectiveness while comparing potential differences in colleges with and
without formal SMS programs.
This concurrent-embedded mixed-method approach utilized quantitative methods
to address two research questions and qualitative methods to address the third research
question. A concurrent-embedded approach is characterized as having a primary research
purpose with some smaller research questions embedded or nested within this primary
question. In this case, this research's primary purpose was to utilize past methods to
evaluate SMS implementation in collegiate aviation programs across multiple universities
to add to these methods' validity and reliability. Extant research (Adjekum, 2014;
Adjekum et al., 2015, 2016; Gao & Rajendran, 2017) generated some findings and
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conclusions through quantitative methods, which need to be further validated and
investigated through qualitative methods. These past findings are about varying
demographic effects on outcomes such as safety behavior. The investigation of why these
variations exist is the embedded question.
SMS Implementation and Safety Behavior
The first research question was directed at utilizing a past model developed by
Adjekum (2017). Some modifications were made based on this initial study's findings,
which included removing some predictor variables (i.e., transformational leadership and
self-efficacy) and adding an outcome variable (i.e., safety reporting behavior). Therefore,
a direct comparison of findings and conclusions will not be possible. However, the SMS
initiative's core elements (i.e., SMSPol and SMSProc) are still present in the current
study, and comparisons as to the effects of these variables on the outcome variables will
be made.
SMS Policy Implementation. SMSPol was found to have a significant effect on
three variables: SMot, SR, and SCB. The effect of SMSPol on SPB was not found to be
significant. The insignificant effect relationship between SMSPol and SPB corroborates
findings from Adjekum (2017). In both cases, the direct line from SMSPol and SPB was
not significant but only became significant when mediated by SMot. This suggests that an
SMS policy is not enough to encourage safety participation behavior. Safety motivation
is needed to encourage safety participation.
The impact of SMSPol was primarily seen in how it affected SMot, SR, and SCB.
The latter two, SR and SCB, are expected. The SR scale was designed to assess the
willingness and frequency by which respondents utilized the safety reporting system.
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Similarly, the SCB scale assessed the extent to which participants followed policies and
procedures stipulated by their organization. Active participation in safety reporting
behavior and safety compliance behavior is the desired outcome for organizations
looking to implement SMS. The effect of SMSPol on these two behaviors shows the
importance of having a clearly articulated safety policy for safety reporting and
compliance behavior.
The predictive relationship between SMSPol and SMot was one of the larger
relationships found in this study (β = .376). The role of leadership and safety climate
could explain the impact of SMSPol on SMot. When leadership articulates the
importance of safety as a core value, that guides desired behavior and can encourage a
higher level of commitment to the organization’s goals (Ford & Tetrick, 2008). Given
that the SMS policy is meant to convey an organization’s stance on the role of safety
within their organization and provide safety objectives, this could explain the impact seen
on SMot by SMSPol. These results suggest that a well-defined SMS policy can motivate
stakeholders while encouraging the desired safety behavior.
SMS Process Engagement. The final measurement model included direct paths
from SMSProc to SCB, SR, and SMot. All these paths were found to be significant. The
direct path from SMSProc to SPB was removed.
The results of this study differed from past research. Adjekum (2017) found a
significant effect of SMSProc on SPB. However, due to low factor loading and, in turn,
model improvements, this path was removed for the current study. Moreover, Adjekum
(2017) did not find a significant effect from SMSProc on SCB, while the present study
did find a significant effect.
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The SMSProc scale assesses how the stakeholders perceive the policies defining
conditions that warrant punitive action, safety-related points of contact, reportable events,
and the reporting system's confidentiality. Since the SCB scale deals with assessing how
respondents comply with the organization's expectations, ensuring these expectations are
clearly defined is essential. This finding suggests that ensuring these organizational
expectations being clearly defined positively influences safety compliance. When
stakeholders are provided with clearly defined expectations, they can better comply with
these expectations.
The SMSProc scale also addresses expectations for safety reporting. Therefore,
the positive effect SMSProc had on SR was expected. The predictive relationship
between SMSProc and SR was one of the larger relationships found in this study (β =
.401). Since some of the items in the SMSProc scale include elements defining what is
supposed to be reported and the nature of the non-punitive reporting system, it is intuitive
that these elements should have a positive influence on SR. Nonetheless, this finding
supports the notion that is having clearly defined expectations of what is supposed to be
reported through the organization’s safety reporting system and implementing a nonpunitive reporting system encourages reporting behavior.
SMSProc also had a positive effect on SMot. This is another difference from past
research studying the relationship of SMSProc on SMot. Adjekum (2017) did not see a
significant effect from SMSProc on SMot. The time differences between the previous
study and the present research could play a role in the different findings. Adjekum (2017)
argued that collegiate aviation programs are needed to engage students and CFIs in SMS
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processes. Perhaps these initiatives have begun to occur, accounting for the different
results observed in the present study.
Additionally, the larger sampling pool to include multiple universities with
varying SMS implementation levels and status and safety culture could also impact why
these findings are different. However, this research's significant findings suggest that
SMSProc plays a positive role in motivating stakeholders' safety behaviors. This finding
also suggests that the expectations for engagement provided through SMSProc have the
potential to motivate stakeholders. Organizations providing clear guidance of the desired
behavior can encourage stakeholders to exert effort to follow through with the outcome
variables related to exemplary safety behavior.
Adjekum (2016) found out from interviews that collegiate aviation leadership
believed that engaging students, student organizations, and flight instructors during SMS
implementation could address some concerns regarding apathy toward the SMS initiative.
Keeping these stakeholders involved could better inform them of their role in the SMS
and address relationship barriers between frontline personnel and top management
(Adjekum, 2016). The role of safety leadership has been shown to impact safety behavior
(Clarke, 2013; D. Cooper, 2015; Shen et al., 2017).
Safety Motivation. The role of safety motivation continues to play a crucial role
in predicting and influencing safety behavior. Past research has highlighted the role of
safety motivation as it relates to safety behavior (Adjekum, 2017; Chen & Chen, 2014;
Christian et al., 2009; Ford & Tetrick, 2008; Ji et al., 2017; Neal & Griffin, 2006;
Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2010). The present findings corroborate these past findings while
adding to the growing research base of collegiate aviation safety behavior.
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There was a significant predictive relationship between SMot and SPB (β = .359)
and SCB (β = .466). Moreover, the inclusion of safety reporting behavior as an outcome
variable was also found to be predicted by SMot. However, the impact of SMot on SR
was not as large (β = .172) as SPB or SCB. In all cases, the effect of SMot on the
outcome variables was statistically significant. This adds to the validity of the notion that
safety motivation is a strong predictor of safety behavior.
Another key takeaway from the findings regarding SMot was the mediating role it
played for SMSPol and SMSProc as they related to the outcome variables. In all cases,
SMot played a statistically significant role in mediating the path from SMSPol or
SMSProc to the outcome variables. Administrators should consider special consideration
to ensuring motivated stakeholders.
This is especially interesting when considering the effects of SMSPol on SPB or
SMSProc on SPB. SMSPol did not have a statistically significant direct effect on SPB,
and the direct path from SMSProc to SPB was removed due to low factor loading for
model improvements. However, when SMot was included in the path as a mediator, the
effect became significant. Based on these findings, it suggests that SMSPol and SMSProc
are not strong enough predictors of SPB. Only when stakeholders are motivated do they
begin to exhibit SPB. Again, these results emphasize the critical role of SMot in
predicting safety behaviors.
SMot was also shown to play a significant role in amplifying the effects of
SMSPol and SMSProc on SCB and SR. While both SMSPol and SMSProc were shown
to affect SCB and SR significantly, these effects were amplified when SMot was included
as a mediator. The larger indirect effects observed were on SCB. These results show a
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direct effect of SMSPol and SMSProc on SCB, but SMot amplifies these effects. This
suggests that SMSPol and SMSproc can encourage SCB, but consideration motivating
stakeholders will encourage better SCB.
Implication for Policy. The findings from this study support the SMS initiative.
The positive impact observed on safety behavior as the result of SMS policy
implementation and SMS process engagement has been reliably validated across multiple
universities. More collegiate aviation programs to fully implement SMS are needed to
facilitate best practices for SMS in collegiate aviation.
Demographic Effects
Past research has found effects on safety-related outcome variables based on
different demographic variables such as year-group (Adjekum et al., 2015; Gao &
Rajendran, 2017) and international student status (Adjekum, 2014; Adjekum et al., 2015;
Noort et al., 2016). The present research aimed to investigate these effects across multiple
universities in which some have fully implemented SMS programs. Moreover, given the
implementation of SMS at some collegiate programs, it was desired to seek whether there
are differences in safety-related behaviors based on SMS implementation status.
Year-Group Effects. Respondents were asked to provide their year-group instead
of age. Since age can sometimes be a misleading indicator of student status (i.e., nontraditional students who are older but just beginning their college experience), year-group
was determined to be a better indicator of experience in the collegiate aviation program.
The present study found statistically significant differences in safety-reporting behavior
based on year-group. Specifically, Senior students were found to have significantly lower
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reported safety reporting behavior. This corroborates previous findings investigating this
same topic (Adjekum et al., 2015, 2016).
Interestingly, students with more experience at their institution tend to have better
perceptions regarding safety culture (Adjekum, 2014), but yet the present study observed
a decrease in reporting by senior students similarly to prior studies investigating reporting
behavior in collegiate aviation (Adjekum et al., 2015, 2016). These findings showing
decreased reporting behavior from senior students warrants administrators' attention and
those in safety leadership positions. Safety reporting is considered an essential element
for SMS (FAA, 2015a; ICAO, 2009) and, therefore, this decreased frequency of reporting
is concerning.
Jausan et al. (2017) performed a thorough review of barriers to reporting in a
military setting to determine reporting barriers. Their findings suggested that
organizational barriers were the primary factor affecting reporting behavior (Jausan et al.,
2017). Lack of leader commitment and lack of feedback were two organizational barriers
that negatively impacted reporting behavior (Jausan et al., 2017). This corroborates prior
suggestions to encourage management and leaders not to disregard senior students to
focus on younger students and ensure adequate feedback (Adjekum et al., 2015, 2016).
Respondents categorized under the Other category had increased reporting. The
respondents who selected Other were CFIs, graduate students, or flight students who
have completed their coursework but still need to fly. Even though some upper-classmen
were included in this group, they still exhibited increased safety reporting as measured by
the SR scale. Some respondents in this group would be considered more senior than
senior level students. While this group had higher reported mean scores for reporting
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behavior than senior-level students, there were no statistical differences compared to
first-year, sophomore, or junior students.
International Students. Variations in reporting behavior between domestic and
international students were found to be statistically significant. Specifically, domestic
students were found to have higher scores for reporting behavior compared to
international students. This, again, has been found multiple times with prior research
(Adjekum et al., 2015; Liao, 2015; Noort et al., 2016). These findings highlight the role
of cultural influences on student behavior.
Given that these two groups exhibit variations in safety reporting behavior, there
is a need to consider these cultural differences when structuring and managing the SMS.
Encouraging reporting behavior from all stakeholders is desired, and these findings show
a gap between domestic and international students. This quantitative study cannot
determine the reasoning for this variation.
Future research could further investigate why international students exhibit
decreased reporting behavior and ways to improve this behavior. Consideration of
language barriers may serve as a viable explanation for this decreased reporting behavior.
If international students do not utilize English as their primary language, that may play a
role in their willingness to participate in the reporting system. Future research could
explore this possibility.
Liao (2015) had addressed this question and provide three recommendations:
leadership, power distance, and incentive programs. Leadership was believed to play a
substantial role in building subordinate trust to encourage reporting. Power distance has
the potential to influence reporting behavior based on cultural norms and perceptions
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negatively. Addressing these barriers and ensuring no negative repercussions will come
from participating is suggested as a means to address these power distance concerns.
Lastly, the bonuses and incentives could facilitate better participation from those
reluctant to share information for fear of receiving negative responses from colleagues.
These findings were based on findings comparing Chinese and Western pilots. Collegiate
aviation programs may have international students from a variety of countries besides
China. Consequently, these recommendations may not address all cultural differences
which influence variations in reporting behavior. Further investigation into more cultural
differences is warranted.
SMS Status. Respondents were asked to provide their SMS implementation
status by answering the question What kind of Safety Management System (SMS) does
your institution have or currently pursuing? This question was originally designed to
assess the potential effects of differing levels of SMS implementation on the outcome
variables. However, the findings showed a sizable proportion of respondents that did not
know what kind of SMS their institution had in place or was pursuing. This was an
intriguing finding as even institutions with fully implemented SMS programs responded
as not knowing or even indicating the wrong type of SMS.
As a result of this finding, an analysis was done to determine any potential effect
of respondent understanding of their SMS status on the outcome variables. The results
indicated that respondents who did not know their institution's SMS status had
statistically significantly lower mean scores on the SPB scale compared to respondents
who responded with the correct type. This shows a knowledge gap between respondents
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and their institutions' SMS status. It also reinforces the positive role an awareness of SMS
initiative can have on respondent’s safety participation behaviors.
This knowledge gap is something that could be addressed by safety leadership.
Evidence exists that shows individuals take more pride in their work when they have a
sense of ownership (Adjekum, 2017; Patankar & Sabin, 2008). While it was evident in
the qualitative portion of this study that SMS training exists at all institutions that
participated in the interviews, there is still a knowledge gap. These findings could be used
as evidence to restructure this training.
An improved understanding of what SMS is and how it works could improve
safety participation. Implementing variations of initial and recurrent training, focusing on
more applied concepts could be used as an assessment of the potential effects of
enhanced SMS knowledge on safety behavioral factors such as participation. Ensuring
training is provided to all stakeholders, and not just students, would be another element to
verify. Future research could address this in a quasi-experimental manner by
implementing an SMS training initiative to determine if there are effects on safety
participation perceptions.
Qualitative Component Discussion
This qualitative component addressed three primary areas: safety culture, SMS
implementation, and safety promotion and communication. Given the limited tenure of
students and CFIs at collegiate aviation programs, efficient adoption of positive safety
culture attributes is desirable. Determining the mechanisms which facilitate this adoption
is prudent. Moreover, the implementation of SMS and related functions is still relatively
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new within collegiate aviation. Determining what effect, if any, this is having on safety
culture is necessary.
Safety Culture. A resounding theme of the influential role the CFI plays in
developing safety culture and on safety behavior was a critical finding. Students and CFIs
interviewed from all institutions pointed to their current and past CFIs as playing a
significant role in how they themselves developed their sense of safety culture. The CFIs
would set the example for proper behavior. This is not surprising given the number of
contact hours CFIs have with students. Students and CFIs are typically meeting multiple
times per week and engaging in what is considered front-line operations. The influence of
this high frequency of meetings is likely to contribute substantially to how students will
perceive acceptable safety behavior in their organization.
This finding also corroborates some of the points made by those interviewed in
safety leadership positions. Those in the safety leadership positions did not believe the
presence of their SMS or their policies were powerful enough on their own to influence
behavior. The people were responsible for carrying out those expectations. While the
policy statements were a guide for describing desired behavior and outcomes, people
(i.e., students, CFIs, Chiefs, managers, etc.) were responsible for carrying out the policies
outlined in that document. While the document can serve as a top-down influence of
guiding desired behavior, the document alone is not sufficient.
This limited role of safety policy to determine safety behavior was also
corroborated by the quantitative findings in this study. SMS policy implementation did
not have a significant direct effect on safety participation. Only when mediated by safety
motivation did safety policy implementation have a significant effect on safety
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participation. This suggests that it takes more than a safety policy to encourage proper
behavior.
The safety policy must lead to proactive safety procedures and guidelines that
modify safe practices and acceptable behavioral outcomes, but the stakeholders must
exhibit the expected behavior, and the CFI has a powerful influence in this role. Even
with a well-written safety policy and directed guidance from higher-level individuals in
the organization, the CFIs can positively or negatively impact how these policy
guidelines are adhered to by flight students operationally. The CFI can, directly and
indirectly, influence students' safety behavior and may enhance strict adherence to these
safety policies or negatively lead to non-compliance. The proximal effects of CFI on
safety policy implementation within a collegiate aviation program cannot be underestimated.
The nature of how the CFI can explicitly exert a more considerable influence on
the operational level implementation of higher-level policy guidance from leadership is
not a novel finding. Research has shown that lateral or peer relationships can have a more
significant impact than managerial influences (Brondino et al., 2012; Chiaburu &
Harrison, 2008). Nonetheless, these findings suggest that attention should be given to
CFIs to ensure they are setting proactive examples of safety behaviors worthy of
emulation. Students and CFIs are considered the front-line of collegiate aviation.
Therefore, their role in establishing and optimizing the desired safety behavioral traits
among personnel and students is critical.
Another critical finding on how students and CFIs develop their safety culture is
their first exposure to the safety reporting system. Frequently stated during the interviews
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was how it took an initial exposure to the reporting system to build trust. This first
exposure seemed like a critical barrier that needed to be overcome before students and
CFIs were willing to contribute to the reporting system. Given the influential role of CFIs
on student behavior, CFIs should prioritize exposing students to the reporting system
early on in their training. This initiative could surmount the first exposure barrier and set
the example for future behavior and participation.
In addition to the first exposure, the feedback was another component of safety
reporting that was commonly cited by students, CFIs, and those in safety leadership
positions. Feedback has been shown to affect safety reporting behavior in previous
quantitative studies (Adjekum et al., 2015, 2016; Jausan et al., 2017). These findings
further validate those claims and suggest that collegiate aviation programs pursuing SMS
should ensure they incorporate a feedback mechanism for their stakeholders.
SMS Implementation. A key finding from the quantitative and qualitative
component of this research was the knowledge gap students and CFIs have regarding the
SMS implementation at their institutions. A sizable proportion of respondents did not
know what kind of SMS their institution had or was pursuing when answering the survey.
Additionally, none of the students or CFIs interviewed correctly identified what kind of
SMS their institution had in place or was pursuing.
Interestingly, most respondents in the interviews would reply by describing the
reporting system. This response suggests an association of the safety reporting system
with their perceived role in the SMS. This is a critical component for students and
instructors. These individuals do need to know their role with the SMS. However, it begs
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the question of what impact an understanding of SMS implementation's various
components could have on their perceived safety behavior.
Further research is needed to determine what effect a deeper understanding of
SMS could have on safety behaviors if any. Perhaps involving students in applied aspects
of SMS processes, such as safety risk assessment or develop policy and objectives, could
provide this more profound understanding.
Those in safety leadership positions did not believe students and CFIs needed to
have a deep understanding of SMS. This perspective referred to SMS processes' technical
aspects to include but not limited to risk assessments and safety assurance processes. It
was viewed as being more important for students and CFIs to understand their role in the
SMS implementation.
Once it was determined that students and CFIs did not have an in-depth
knowledge of SMS, they were asked if a more profound understanding would influence
how they perceive SMS and their perception of safety culture. The students and CFIs
indicated that it could have an effect, and this may be due to an increased sense of
ownership (Adjekum, 2017; Patankar & Sabin, 2008). This gap is an area that could be
addressed with future research and an initiative for institutions to restructure their method
for training their students and CFIs about SMS.
Velazquez and Bier (2015) analyzed the status of safety and SMS training in
collegiate aviation programs and found many programs offer a single class addressing
SMS and that there is not much standardization to the way SMS is taught in collegiate
aviation. This study's qualitative findings showed that SMS education is embedded in
flight training and classes, but the knowledge gap still exists. SMS is a complex topic
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with many components such as safety policy and objectives formulations, safety risk
management strategies, safety assurance processes, and documentation and recordkeeping. Providing some form of initial and recurrent training to address smaller SMS
components may make it easier for students to retain and understand SMS. Expecting
students to learn SMS in its entirety from a single course may not be effective.
Recent research into teaching safety science has suggested the approach of
pragmatism as a means to educate safety-orientated professionals (Klockner et al., 2020).
Pragmatism can be defined as “…centered on linking theory, research, ideas, actions to
practical effects and focuses on aligning these with the student’s experience and
environment” (Klockner et al., 2020, p. 3). This position seems to align with the desired
methods suggested by participants in the interviews. Students and CFIs seem to desire
this pragmatic approach. Structuring SMS training for students and CFIs around the
“4P’s of Pragmatism” (i.e., practical, pluralistic, provisional, and participatory) could be
a beneficial approach for administrators (Klockner et al., 2020). Utilizing scenarios has
also been proposed as a method to allow students and CFIs to apply SMS skills in a
practical manner (Adjekum, personal communication, 2020).
The outcomes from SMS processes are likely to generate controls and mitigations,
resulting in various safety policies and procedures (FAA, 2015a). The presence of these
policies and procedures was viewed as favorable by students and CFIs. While there may
be a high volume of policies and procedures, students and CFIs recognize their
importance and make a conscious effort at strict compliance or adherence. This seems to
suggest that students and CFIs respect and appreciate the presence of SMS based on their
perception of SMS outcomes.
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The findings from the semi-structured interviews revealed that those in safety
leadership did not believe the presence of SMS inherently played a role in the students’
and CFIs’ perception of safety culture. This assertation is based on comments received
from those in safety leadership positions referring to their SMS as “a guide” and that it
does more for the administration to say SMS than for students. However, it is evident that
SMS implementation outcomes, such as cogent safety policies and procedures, play a
significant role in moderating desired safety behaviors.
This perspective echoes advocates of the Safety-II approach. Proponents of the
Safety-II approach address people's role within the organization and posit that cultural
influences drive compliance with organization policies and procedures (Hollnagel, 2014).
This perspective is shared with the dichotomous perspective of Old-View and New-View
of safety (Dekker, 2017). This perspective posits that organizations cannot regulate or
proceduralize their way to safety (Dekker, 2014). Moreover, some suggest that this
emphasis on relying on policies and regulations to address cultural factors is putative
(Grote & Weichbrodt, 2017).
Nonetheless, those in Safety Leadership positions that were interviewed did view
the implementation of SMS in their institutions as a positive change. While the
implementation and presence did not explicitly impact their perspective regarding safety
culture, the improvements to processes, such as enhanced accountability and robust
audits, provided better outcomes from their previous safety programs. These audits'
robust nature would ensure no aspect of the organization's processes was missed. If the
audits identified system weaknesses, this would guide the development of policies and
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procedures to address these deficiencies. This improved the overall accountability of the
organization.
This enhanced accountability provided a more comprehensive approach to safety.
While these improvements were not perceived to improve safety culture directly, the
effects of SMS implementation improved the organization's function. The outcomes from
these SMS functions would provide the guidance to ensure organization stakeholders
have the proper direction on the desired behavior. While these written policies may not
explicitly dictate behavioral outcomes for stakeholders, they serve as the guide for all
levels below top-level management to follow and promote. The connection seems to be
that SMS can improve elements related to safety policy from a top-down perspective
(FAA, 2015a). Stakeholders must then promote this policy and motivate stakeholders to
ensure participation and compliance based on the safety policy's guidance. This approach
is substantiated by this study's quantitative findings where safety motivation was the
strongest predictor of safety participation and safety compliance behavior. Additionally,
safety motivation played a significant mediating role for both SMS policy
implementation and SMS process engagement.
Safety Promotion and Communication. The training provided to students in
programs with and without fully implemented SMS programs does not seem to provide
students and CFIs with an in-depth knowledge of SMS. While students and CFIs are well
educated in their respective roles within the SMS, there is clearly a gap in SMS deeper
understanding. Formal training on SMS and its components can be challenging and needs
to be viewed within a collegiate aviation program's scope and complexity. A suggested
approach based on these research findings will be a step-wise building block approach in
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SMS training that is incorporated as part of the syllabus for the degree program in
aviation. Fundamentals of SMS can be introduced as a required course at the first-year
class, and subsequent intricate details on SMS introduced at the upper-class levels.
Subject-matter experts may be brought in occasionally to build the capacity of professors
who teach SMS to enhance course delivery and ensure a cogent link between theory and
practices.
Moreover, students and CFIs often mentioned a need for a practical application of
SMS. Involving students or CFIs in some of the higher-level SMS processes, such as
safety risk assessments (SRAs), could be a way to address this issue. Additionally, these
applied exercises would give students the experience they could use moving forward in
their careers. Many aviation students aspire to be airline pilots, and part 121 carriers are
required to have SMS (FAA, 2015b), and there is a demand for SMS in the part 135
environment (NTSB, n.d.). Another benefit of this approach is providing students and
CFIs with a sense of ownership in the SMS process, which can improve safety behavior
(Adjekum, 2017; Patankar & Sabin, 2008).
Implication for Theory. Safety administrators should heed the role of safety
motivation as a critical function for facilitating desired safety behaviors. Initiatives to
ensure motivation for stakeholders has been shown to be a strong predictor of desired
safety behaviors. Moreover, the flight instructors' role may play a significant part in
promoting safety and ensuring safety motivation. Proper attention should be given to
flight instructors to promote safety, given their critical role in guiding students' behavior.
Developing a means to motivate flight instructors could permeate these attitudes and
behaviors throughout the organization.
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Adjekum (2016) investigated the role of transformational leadership on safety
motivation and safety behavior. Adjekum’s (2016) findings suggested that
transformational leadership had a direct positive effect on safety participation. Another
interesting finding was the negative relationship between transformational leadership and
safety motivation (Adjekum, 2016). It was suggested that this finding could imply that
leaders exhibiting high levels of transformational leadership could result in complacency
from the perception that the system is inherently safe.
Given the role of leadership on behavior, Cooper (2015) investigated the role of
multiple leadership styles on safety behavior (i.e., transformational, transactional, and
servant). All of these leadership styles were found to have effects on safety behavior,
either directly or indirectly. Some of these indirect effects include improving employee
engagement, which can improve behavior or provide a supportive environment that can,
in turn, affect employee engagement and behavior. Clarke (2013) had similar conclusions
showing that transformational leadership primarily encouraged safety participation, and
transactional leadership primarily affected safety compliance. All of these findings
suggest that an active leadership style can have a positive impact on safety behavior.
Passive approaches to safety have been shown to have adverse effects, such as noncompliance (Kjellevold Olsen et al., 2020).
Implication for Practice. Developing or revamping the methods to teach
students and CFIs could enhance perceptions surround the SMS initiative. Currently,
there seems to be a knowledge gap for both groups (i.e., students and CFIs) in
organizations with and without fully implemented SMS. The increased sense of
ownership provided by this enhanced knowledge and understanding could improve
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perceptions surround the SMS initiative (Adjekum, 2017; Patankar & Sabin, 2008).
Emphasis on a pragmatic approach to safety education may provide a more practical and
applied approach, which seems to be desired by research participants (Klockner et al.,
2020)
Limitations
While the researcher targeted a purposive sample from the population of
respondents from U.S collegiate aviation programs with SMS, there were still issues with
unequal sample sizes from the survey part of the research. This leads to higher and lower
representations of individual institutions' perceptions regarding the studied variables.
Therefore, the findings cannot represent the population of collegiate aviation programs.
Quantitative surveys are sometimes prone to biases and subjectivity. Self-serving
bias, framing effects, and response biases can affect responses and need to be considered
when making inferences from surveys. However, every effort was made to minimize
these biases and subjectivity through face validity test of items and reverse-coding of
some items to minimize framing effects. For some scales, the low-reliability scores, such
as safety reporting, suggest comprehensibility issues with items in the scale and may need
future re-wording and re-validation of items in that scale.
All the analyses were done based on respondents' perceptions, which can be
influenced by environmental factors and incidental safety occurrences in the program.
Adverse perceptions may be captured due to such one-time safety occurrences that may
not be reflective of the actual long-term safety culture in the program. The results from
such methods should be considered when utilizing the findings. Evidence existed that
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there may have been issues with response bias and reliability on some scales. The reader
must consider these limitations when making conclusions from the research findings.
Conclusions
This study utilized a previously validated tool to measure the SMS initiative's
effectiveness as measured by SMS Policy Implementation and SMS Process Engagement
on different safety behaviors. The findings suggested that these SMS initiatives work
well to predict safety behavior—predominantly when mediated by safety motivation.
Collegiate aviation programs considering or pursuing SMS should consider evaluating
their institutions to determine their SMS initiative's effects on safety behavior.
Multiple demographic effects found in previous studies, such as year-group
effects and differences based on international student status, are still present across
multiple universities. Those in safety leadership positions should be cognizant of these
effects and structure initiatives to address these variations. Ensuring desired safety
behavior for all student groups is crucial for optimal performance. Addressing the yeargroup effects by ensuring appropriate safety promotion to all levels of stakeholders
within collegiate aviation programs could be one approach to mitigating the year-group
effects. Similarly, developing initiatives to ensure international students' involvement is
necessary based on the presence of variations in safety behavior found across multiple
universities.
SMS implementation in most U.S collegiate aviation programs is still in its
preliminary stages, with only one program attaining the FAA SMSVP status of active
conformance. However, findings from the semi-structured interviews suggest an apparent
knowledge gap among respondents on the SMS implementation phases and some
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essential attributes of a fully-functional SMS program. Structuring or restructuring SMS
training for students and CFIs could improve safety behaviors for stakeholders. Further
research is needed to investigate this finding.
The CFI plays a critical role in developing the student’s perception of safety
culture. The CFI sets the example for desired safety behavior and can play a significant
role in exposing students to the safety processes institutions have in place. Initiatives to
address the role of the CFI to empower them to be leaders for students and encourage
active participation can influence the efficiency and effectiveness by which students
develop their sense of safety culture.
Recommendations for Future Research
There is still a need to perform longitudinal studies to investigate safety culture in
collegiate aviation programs in the U.S. Analyzing a cohort of students across the span of
their tenure at an institution would provide a new perspective of how some of the
variables are affected over time. This could require identifying these cohorts early on in
their tenure and evaluating them yearly to determine these effects.
An evaluation of the potential effects of enhanced SMS training for students and
CFIs is needed. Given the knowledge gap found in the current research, there is potential
to address this finding. A quasi-experimental approach before and after an SMS training
initiative may determine any potential effects of enhanced SMS knowledge on safety
behavior.
As more collegiate aviation programs pursue and implement SMS, additional
research will be needed to evaluate the effects of SMS in collegiate aviation
continuously. The current research is still limited to universities with fully implemented
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SMS and others which have only begun the implementation process. As more programs
successfully implement SMS, an investigation into effectiveness and impacts on safety
performance in terms of observed safety behaviors and attitudes (safety culture) is
necessary.
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Appendix A
Semi-Structured Interview Outline
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Appendix B
Quantitative Survey Questions

Safety Culture in Collegiate Aviation
Start of Block: Consent Page
The University of North Dakota Consent to Participate in Research
Project Title: Safety Culture in Collegiate Aviation: A Cross-sectional Analysis Between
Multiple Universities
Principal Investigator: Tony Foster Phone/Email Address (PI):
563.249.9167/robert.a.foster@ndus.edu
Department (PI): Aviation Advisor: Daniel Kwasi Adjekum, Ph.D., CSP.
Email/Phone: daniel.adjekum@ndus.edu (701-777-6689)
What should I know about this research?
Taking part in this research is voluntary. Whether you take part is up to you. If you don’t take
part, it won’t be held against you. You may take part now and later drop out, and it won’t be
held against you. If you don’t understand, ask questions. Contact the investigator with any
questions before you decide to participate.
How long will I be in this research?
We expect that your participation in this research will last approximately 10 minutes (taking the
survey un-interrupted). This survey will be online for a maximum period of 6 weeks.
Why is this research being done?
The purpose of this research is to assess safety culture perceptions at various collegiate aviation
institutions due to Safety Management Systems (SMS) implementation. Different collegiate
aviation programs around the United States have varying types of Safety Management Systems
(SMS) as well as varying levels of implementation. This research is meant to gauge variations in
safety culture and specifically safety behavior based on the perceptions of respondents in these
programs.
What happens to me if I agree to take part in this research?
If you decide to take part in this research study, you will be required to read and agree to this
online consent statement by clicking on the YES radio button at the end of the statement. If you
click No, you will be directed to the end of the survey and you can close the survey.
After agreeing to take part in the survey by clicking YES, you will be asked to complete an online
survey about your perceptions on safety culture in your collegiate aviation program. Included in

133

the survey will be questions on year group, gender, functional group, and collegiate aviation
program.
If for any reason you feel that some or all of the questions are such that you prefer
not to answer, you are at liberty to skip it or end the survey without any adverse effect on you.
Could being in this research hurt me?
There are no risks participating in this research beyond those experienced in everyday life.
Will being in this research benefit me?
It is not expected that you will personally or financially benefit from the research. However, you
may choose to be part of the shared responsibility for safety within your collegiate aviation
program by taking part in this study. The study will provide data and tools for continuous
improvement of safety culture and encourage proactive safety behaviors. The study will
enhance effective safety report management, hazard identification and safety risk mitigations in
collegiate aviation. The study will also provide a better framework for SMS implementation for
other collegiate aviation programs throughout the United States.
How many people will participate in this research?
Approximately 1,000 students, staff, and faculty various collegiate aviation programs will take
part in this study.
Will it cost me money to take part in this research?
You will not have any costs for being in this research study.
Will I be paid for taking part in this research?
There will be no financial incentive for taking part in this survey.
Who is funding this research?
There is no funding being provided for this research.
What happens to information collected for this research?
The survey does not ask for any information that would identify who the responses belong to
(anonymous online). Therefore, your responses are recorded anonymously. If this research is
published, no information that would identify you will be included since your name is in no way
linked to your responses.
All survey responses that we receive will be treated confidentially and stored on a secure
server. However, given that the surveys can be completed from any computer (e.g., personal,
work, school), we are unable to guarantee the security of the computer on which you choose to
enter your responses. As a participant in our study, we want you to be aware that certain "key
logging" software programs exist that can be used to track or capture data that you enter
and/or websites that you visit.
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What if I agree to be in the research and then change my mind?
If you decide to leave the study early, we ask that you close the link by skipping to the end of
the survey and opting out. You may contact the principal investigator using the email address
and telephone number provided in this consent statement. Skipping questions or deciding to
opt out of the survey will not have to adverse impact on you.
Who can answer my questions about this research?
If you have questions, concerns, or complaints, or think this research has hurt you or made you
sick, talk to the PI of the research team at the phone number listed above on the first page.
This research is being overseen by the UND Institutional Review Board (“IRB”). An IRB is a
group of people who perform an independent review of research studies. You may talk to them
at 701.777.4279 or UND.irb@UND.edu If You have questions, concerns, or complaints that
are not being answered by the research team. You are not getting answers from the research
team. You cannot reach the research team. You want to talk to someone else about the
research. You have questions about your rights as a research subject. You may also visit the UND
IRB website for more information about being a research
subject: http://und.edu/research/resources/human-subjects/research-participants.html

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
End of Block: Consent Page
Start of Block: Demographic Details
Q2.1 Year Group

o Freshman (1)
o Sophomore (2)
o Junior (3)
o Senior (4)
o Other (5) ________________________________________________
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Q2.2 Highest Flight Certificate Held

o Student (1)
o Private (2)
o Commercial (3)
o Certified Flight Instructor or Air Transport Pilot (4)
Q2.3 Gender

o Male (1)
o Female (2)
Q2.4 Are you an international student?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
Q2.5 What University do you attend for flight training or currently employs you?
________________________________________________________________
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Q2.6 What kind of Safety Management System (SMS) does your institution have or currently
pursuing?

o FAA accepted SMS Voluntary Program (SMSVP) (1)
o International Standards-Business Aircraft Operations (IS-BAO) / Third-Party Vendor
SMS (2)

o Do not know (3)
o None (4)
Q2.7 What is your functional group?

o Student (1)
o Permanent Employee/Staff (2)
o Faculty (3)
End of Block: Demographic Details
Start of Block: Policy Implementation
Q3.1 Please provide your degree of agreement regarding the following statements about the
Safety Management System (SMS) in your flight program
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Q3.2 The safety policy is signed and approved by the University President, Dean, or other
Accountable Executive, who demonstrates a commitment to safety through active and visible
participation in the SMS.

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Somewhat disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Somewhat agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
Q3.3 The results of safety performance reviews are used by the program leadership as input for
safety improvement processes.

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Somewhat disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Somewhat agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
Q3.4 There is a process that provides for the capture of information on hazards, incidents,
accidents and other data relevant to SMS

o Strongly disagree (1)
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o Somewhat disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Somewhat agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
Q3.5 Safety professionals with appropriate skills, knowledge, and experience conduct SMS
training

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Somewhat disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Somewhat agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
Q3.6 There is a high emphasis on providing adequate financial and technical resources to
improve the SMS

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Somewhat disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Somewhat agree (4)
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o Strongly agree (5)
Q3.7 Policies and procedures in SMS manual are easy to understand

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Somewhat disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Somewhat agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
End of Block: Policy Implementation
Start of Block: Process Engagement
Q4.1 Please provide your degree of agreement regarding the following statements about the
SMS in your flight program

Q4.2 Conditions under which punitive disciplinary action would be considered (e.g. illegal
activity, negligence or willful misconduct) are not clearly defined.

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Somewhat disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
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o Somewhat agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
Q4.3 Students/Personnel are not informed on the primary contacts for aviation safety-related
matters.

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Somewhat disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Somewhat agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
Q4.4 The scope of the safety-related hazards that must be reported are not explained to
students/personnel.

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Somewhat disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Somewhat agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
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Q4.5 Safety concerns reported through the safety reporting system are corrected in a timely
manner

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Somewhat disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Somewhat agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
Q4.6 Knowing how and where to report safety concerns is easy

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Somewhat disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Somewhat agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
Q4.7 Safety reporting system does not provide confidentiality for safety reports filed and feedback received

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Somewhat disagree (2)
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o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Somewhat agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
End of Block: Process Engagement
Start of Block: Safety Reporting Behavior
Q5.1 Please provide your degree of agreement

Q5.2 I file reports about unsafe situations, even if the situation was caused by my own actions

o Never (1)
o Sometimes (2)
o About half the time (3)
o Most of the time (4)
o Always (5)
Q5.3 I file reports on safety deviations without fear of negative outcomes

o Never (1)
o Sometimes (2)
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o About half the time (3)
o Most of the time (4)
o Always (5)
Q5.4 I do not report unsafe actions of others because I am not empowered to do so

o Never (1)
o Sometimes (2)
o About half the time (3)
o Most of the time (4)
o Always (5)
End of Block: Safety Reporting Behavior
Start of Block: Safety Compliance
Q6.1 Please provide your degree of agreement regarding the following statements about
yourself

Q6.2 I pay full attention to pre-flight briefing during flight operations

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Somewhat disagree (2)
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o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Somewhat agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
Q6.3 I follow correct safety procedures in flight operations

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Somewhat disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Somewhat agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
Q6.4 I ensure the highest level of safety in flight operations

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Somewhat disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Somewhat agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
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End of Block: Safety Compliance
Start of Block: Safety Participation
Q7.1 Please provide your degree of agreement regarding the following statements about
yourself

Q7.2 I promote the safety program within the flight program

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Somewhat disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Somewhat agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
Q7.3 I put in extra effort to improve the flight safety program

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Somewhat disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Somewhat agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
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Q7.4 I volunteer for safety-related task in the flight program

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Somewhat disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Somewhat agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
End of Block: Safety Participation
Start of Block: Safety Motivation
Q8.1 Please provide your degree of agreement regarding the following statements about
yourself

Q8.2 It’s worthwhile to improve personal safety

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Somewhat disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Somewhat agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
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Q8.3 It’s important to maintain safety at all times

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Somewhat disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Somewhat agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
Q8.4 It’s important to reduce the risk of safety events in flight operations

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Somewhat disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Somewhat agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
End of Block: Safety Motivation
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Appendix C
Tree Diagram of Emergent Themes from Qualitative Analysis
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Appendix D
IRB Approval (Survey)
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Appendix E
IRB Approval (Interviews)
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Appendix F
Final Measurement Model
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Appendix G
Final Measurement Model Goodness-of-Fit Indices
Table 9. Final Measurement Model Goodness-of-Fit Indices
Iteration
Final
Measurement
Model

Chi-square (χ2)

χ2 (194, n = 451)
= 467.542,
CMIN/DF =
2.410, p < .001

NFI

IFI

TLI

CFI

0.903 0.941 0.929 0.941
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RMSEA

.056 (.050 - .062)
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